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The Uneasy Case for Food Safety
Liability Insurance
John Aloysius Cogan Jr.†
INTRODUCTION
Food safety liability insurance is emerging as one of the
latest trends in market-based food safety regulation. But why?
The answer is simple: food is our most dangerous consumer
product,1 and our federal and local governments do not fully
protect us from its perils.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), one in six—about 48 million—Americans
suffer from foodborne illnesses, such as Salmonella, Norovirus,
Listeria, and Escherichia coli (E. Coli), each year. Annually,
128,000 Americans require hospitalization and 3,000 die from
foodborne illnesses.2 Many of the survivors of these enteric
foodborne illnesses3 are left suffering from chronic and
debilitating conditions such as kidney failure, paralysis, and
rheumatoid arthritis.4 And beyond the profound physical tolls of
Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
See JEAN C. BUZBY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL ECON. REPORT
NO. 799, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND MICROBIAL FOODBORNE ILLNESS 1 (2001), http://www.ers.
usda.gov/media/533488/aer799.pdf [http://perma.cc/LT67-5ZZN] (noting that “contaminated
food products cause more deaths each year than the combined totals of all 15,000 products
regulated by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission”).
2 Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Estimates of Foodborne Illness],
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden [https://perma.cc/986Y-VPZC].
3 “Enteric infections,” such as E. coli, Salmonella, Norovirus, and Listeria,
“enter the body through the mouth and intestinal tract and are usually spread through
contaminated food and water or by contact with vomit or feces.” Enteric Diseases
Epidemiology Branch, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dfwed/edeb/ [http://perma.cc/7FK6-KK9X].
4 A bout of foodborne illness can have serious health aftereffects, or sequelae.
Sequelae can include reactive arthritis, urinary tract problems, eye damage, GuillainBarré syndrome, ulcerative colitis, diabetes, kidney failure, and paralysis. For example,
certain forms of E. coli, such as E. coli O157:H7, can lead to kidney failure, coma, and
permanent paralysis. See E. coli O157:H7 and Other Shiga Toxin-Producing E. coli, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/
pathogens/ecoli.html [http://perma.cc/8TW5-KVBG]. For a description of how E. coli
O157:H7 severely affected one victim, see Michael Moss, The Burger That Shattered
Her Life, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/health/04meat.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8GVG-4ZEU] (detailing how consumption
†
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foodborne illness are its staggering economic consequences.
Medical expenses, productivity losses, and the economic cost of
premature deaths, pain, and suffering in the United States due to
foodborne illness have been estimated at $77.7 billion annually5—
a figure equal to seven percent of our total annual spending on
food.6 Yet despite the illnesses and deaths, major outbreaks and
media attention,7 staggering costs, and new federal legislation
aimed at improving food safety,8 the situation has not
significantly improved. While the number of illnesses attributable
to foodborne pathogens has declined somewhat since 1996,9 CDC
researchers have concluded that the overall incidence of
foodborne illness “has not changed significantly” over the last
of hamburger containing E. coli O157:H7 resulted in paralysis of a 22-year-old woman).
Sequelae are not, however, limited to individuals who suffered serious cases of food
poisoning, but have been linked to victims who experienced minor cases of foodborne
illnesses. See Maryn McKenna, Food Poisoning’s Hidden Legacy, SCI. AM. (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/food-poisonings-hidden-legacy/?page=1 [http://p
erma.cc/3N39-8CWZ]; see also William F. Clark et al., Long Term Risk for Hypertension,
Renal Impairment, and Cardiovascular Disease After Gastroenteritis from Drinking
Water Contaminated with Escherichia Coli O157:H7: A Prospective Cohort Study,
THEBMJ (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bm [http://perma.cc/68LE-UK
C6] (finding that residents who suffered acute gastroenteritis during a townwide outbreak
due to Escherichia coli O157:H7 and Campylobacter in the water supply had a greater
risk developing of kidney problems, suffering heart attack or stroke, and developing high
blood pressure in the eight years following the outbreak).
5 Robert L. Scharff, Economic Burden from Health Losses Due to Foodborne
Illness in the United States, 75 J. FOOD PROTECTION 123, 124, 128 (2012) (using an
enhanced cost-of-illness model that more completely captures the economic costs of
foodborne illness).
6 Total annual spending on food in the United States in 2011 was $1.3 trillion.
Table 1—Food and Alcoholic Beverages: Total Expenditures, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON.
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-expenditures.aspx#.VEPgGda
pqMI [http://perma.cc/XPR4-HX9D] (last updated July 14, 2016).
7 Outbreaks of foodborne illness are regularly reported in the news media. See,
e.g., Debra Goldschmidt, Cilantro Eyed as Possible Source of Gastrointestinal Illness
Outbreak, CNN (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/03/health/cilantrocyclosporiasis-outbreak/ [http://perma.cc/L5ZA-YJUD]; Rachel Abrams, Frozen Chicken
Recalled After Reports of Illnesses, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/17/business/frozen-chicken-recalled-after-reports-of-illnesses.html?ref=topics
[http://perma.cc/8XV5-PZTP]; Sarah Parvini, Three Deaths Linked to Tainted Ice Cream
in Kansas, Prompting Recall, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2015, 4:05 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-ice-cream-deaths-20150314-story.html [http://
perma.cc/7N8K-U3DZ].
8 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FSMA]. The FSMA
shifts the burden onto food suppliers to ensure that their products are safe and relies
less on FDA inspectors. The law requires better recordkeeping and contingency plans
for handling outbreaks and preventing the spread of contaminants, and it gives the
FDA new mandatory recall authority, a power it never had before. For a summary of
the FSMA, see Ashley B. Burkett, Note, Food Safety in the United States: Is the Food
Safety Modernization Act Enough to Lead Us Out of the Jungle?, 63 ALA. L. REV. 919,
930-39 (2012).
9 Stacy M. Crim et al., Incidence and Trends of Infection with Pathogens
Transmitted Commonly Through Food—Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network,
10 U.S. Sites, 2006–2013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 328, 331 (2014).
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decade.10 But there is even more to worry about. Emerging
evidence suggests that microbial pathogens in our food supply
also cause infections outside of the digestive system.
There is strong evidence that raw retail chicken—the
kind sold in supermarkets—contributes to the transmission of
extraintestinal E. coli that causes urinary tract infections (UTIs).
Every year, six to eight million UTIs occur in the United States,
with more than 80% associated with E. coli.11 Complicating the
UTI problem is the growing prevalence of drug-resistant strains
of E. coli, which increase the severity and cost of treating UTIs.12
Once thought to be a sporadic condition, community-wide
epidemics of UTIs are emerging, and retail chicken appears to be
the culprit. Genetic evidence connects E. coli from retail chicken
to E. coli causing human UTIs, suggesting that foodborne E. coli
can lead to urinary tract and other extraintestinal infections.13
The United States is not alone in its struggles with food
safety. According to the World Health Organization, foodborne
pathogens are a global problem, sickening an estimated 582
million people annually and killing 351,000.14 China, for example,
has a particularly acute food safety problem,15 and western
European nations suffer high rates of foodborne illness.16
Id. at 328.
Caroline Vincent et al., Food Reservoir for Escherichia Coli Causing
Urinary Tract Infections, 16 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88 (2010). These
infections are responsible for an estimated $1–2 billion in annual health care costs in
the United States and are the most common source for E. coli–related bloodstream
infections, which lead to sepsis and kill 40,000 people each year. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 91-93.
14 See News Release, World Health Org., World Health Day 2015: From Farm
to Plate, Make Food Safe (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases
/2015/food-safety/en/ [http://perma.cc/AH42-DTMZ] (2010 figures).
15 China’s food supply is not only subject to microbial contamination, but also
to safety problems related to pollution, chemical contamination, and adulteration.
Chenhao Jia & David Jukes, The National Food Safety Control System of China—A
Systematic Review, 32 FOOD CONTROL 236, 237 (2013). There is no reliable nationallevel data on foodborne illness in China, where underreporting of food safety problems
is common. See Hon-Ming Lam et al., Food Supply and Food Safety Issues in China,
381 LANCET 2044, 2048 (2013) (noting that “fewer than 20,000 major food poisoning
incidents a year [are] officially reported . . . and the number of incidents is surely much
higher”). Anecdotal evidence, however, paints a grim picture. China’s food safety
problems are routinely described as “frightening,” “appalling,” and “bizarre.” See, e.g.,
Bruce Einhorn, More Scares Ahead After China’s Rat Meat Scandal, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(May 6, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-06/more-scares-ahead-afterchinas-rat-meat-scandal [http://perma.cc/8X34-CSXY] (describing a rat meat scandal as
“the latest frightening food-safety scare from China”); Nancy Huehnergarth & Bettina
Siegel, Chicken from China? Your Seafood Is Already Being Processed There, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/03/chicken-from-chinayour-seafood-is-already-being-processed-there/#.U9qXC0iRLY0 [http://perma.cc/Q2YV-M
DQV] (describing China’s food safety record as “appalling”); Mark Bitman, China’s
Bizarre Food ‘Safety’ Scene, and Our Own, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011, 3:25 PM), http://
bittman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/chinas-bizarre-food-safety-scene-and-our-own/?modul
10
11
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The United States, China, and many other countries have
extensive regulatory regimes designed to ensure the safety of
their food. Yet severe problems persist, raising the question:
What more can be done to improve food safety? As the possible
answers to this question are pondered, a corollary inquiry is
often made: Can private market actors improve the safety of
our food? Many believe that private market mechanisms can
indeed make our food safer. One such mechanism, food safety
liability insurance, appears to be gaining popularity as a means
to improve food safety. Scholars have suggested that
compulsory food safety liability insurance, a specialized
insurance product through which insurers manage food safety
risk, could supplement or even supplant government regulation
of food safety.17 Governments are exploring the benefits of food
safety insurance. In China, the government is promoting the
development of a new market for food safety liability insurance
coverage18 with the hope that private insurance companies will
augment government food safety systems by increasing
supervision over the food industry.19 In the United States, food
safety concerns are also prompting an increasing number of
retail food buyers and institutional food providers (such as
schools and hospitals) to require their small-farm food

e=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22 [http://perma.cc/
7HJZ-8YFP] (calling China’s food safety incidents “bizarre”).
16 See generally European Food Safety Auth. & European Ctr. for Disease
Prevention and Control, The European Union Summary Report on Trends and Sources of
Zoonoses, Zoonotic Agents and Food-Borne Outbreaks in 2012, 12 EFSA J., 2014, at 1,
5, http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/EU-summary-report-zoonoses-food
-borne-outbreaks-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TAK-C73Y] (detailing rates of foodborne
illness in the European Union); see also Jennifer McEntire, Foodborne Illness: How Do
the U.S. and EU Compare?, ACHESON GROUP BLOG (Mar. 6, 2014), http://achesongroup.com/
2014/03/foodborne-illness-us-eu-compare/ [http://perma.cc/TJ8R-YZNE] (comparing rates of
foodborne illness in the United States and the European Union).
17 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 243-45 (2012) (arguing that
compulsory food safety liability insurance would place liability insurers in the role of
business licensers and regulators of food safety).
18 FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHINA’S FOOD SAFETY LAW
14 (2015), http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Amended%20Food
%20Safety%20Law%20of%20China_Beijing_China%20-%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_
5-18-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/JHM4-VFAM]. China had originally considered imposing a
compulsory food liability insurance scheme. See David Green, China Briefing: Beijing
Puts Wheels in Motion on New Safety Laws, JUST-FOOD (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.justfood.com/management-briefing/beijing-puts-wheels-in-motion-on-new-safety-laws_id1252
57.aspx [http://perma.cc/EJ4C-5L7U]; Xu Wei, Liability Insurance Proposed for Food
Industries, CHINA DAILY (July 3, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/20
14-07/03/content_17638955.htm [http://perma.cc/VTR4-FZNF].
19 Wei, supra note 18 (quoting Xu Jinghe, director of legal affairs for China’s
Food and Drug Administration).
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suppliers to carry food safety liability insurance,20 some in
response to an exemption of small farms from the reach of the
Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA).21 Even Congress has
considered the merits of insurance as a possible regulator of food
safety. The 2014 Farm Bill required the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to undertake a feasibility study of food safety
insurance for certain crops.22
It should come as no surprise that food safety liability
insurance is at the forefront of market-based food safety initiatives.
Perhaps the most significant development in insurance theory over
the last several decades is the idea that insurance can be an
effective private regulator of risk. Carol Heimer,23 Kenneth
Abraham,24 Tom Baker and Peter Siegleman,25 and Omri BenShahar and Kyle Logue,26 among others,27 have all described
20 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Boys et al., The Food Safety Modernization Act:
Implications for U.S. Small Scale Farms, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 401 (2015)
[hereinafter Boys et al., The Food Safety Modernization Act] (noting that an increasing
number of food buyers now require that their suppliers carry food product liability
insurance); Kathryn A. Boys, Food Product Liability Insurance: Implications for the
Marketing of Specialty Crops, CHOICES MAG., 4th Q. 2013, http://www.choicesmagazine.
org/choices-magazine/theme-articles/attitudes-towards-risk-in-a-changing-agricultural-m
arketing-environment/food-product-liability-insurance-implications-for-the-marketing-ofspecialty-crops [http://perma.cc/24S8-JZPX] (noting that buyers of specialty crops require
farmers to purchase food liability insurance); KRISTEN MARKLEY, CMTY. FOOD SEC. COAL.,
FOOD SAFETY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (2010), https://www.mffh.org/mm/files/Food_
Safety_and_Liability_Ins-EmergingIssues.pdf [http://perma.cc/GMZ2-XQFJ].
21 See Boys et al., The Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 20, at 397,
400 (noting an “increasingly prevalent requirement that small farms obtain [food safety
liability] coverage”). For an overview of the FSMA and its requirements, see supra note 8.
22 See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 11022, 128
Stat. 649 (2014) (requiring the USDA “to conduct a study to determine whether offering
policies that provide coverage for specialty crops from food safety and contamination issues
would benefit agricultural producers”).
23 Carol A. Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits of
Private Regulation Through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE
OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 116, 125-28 (Tom Baker & Jonathon Simon eds.,
2002) (describing how the need for insurance regulates access to certain activities, such
as home buying and renting cars); CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL
ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 42-48 (1985) (describing
the techniques through which insurance requirements encourage safety improvements,
including underwriting and risk-based premiums).
24 Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
653, 684 (2013) (observing that “insurance functions like government by influencing
policyholders’ conduct and protecting them against misfortune”) [hereinafter Abraham,
Four Conceptions]; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 57 (1986) (using the
term “surrogate regulation” to describe the role of insurers providing liability coverage
for toxic torts and environmental risks).
25 Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance:
A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS
177-180 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) (describing risk-control devices in liability insurance).
26 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 201.
27 See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 48 (2003)
(describing insurance as a mechanism capable of, among other things, managing risk);
Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial
Responsibility for Hazardous Waste, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 405-06 (1986) (describing the use of
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the capacity of insurers to regulate the risky behavior of their
insureds. Ben-Shahar and Logue have even made a strong case
that insurers are often more effective at regulating risk and
improving public safety than government agencies.28 The basic
theory of insurance as a private safety regulator is relatively
simple and quite compelling. Insurers act to minimize their
losses through a variety of risk-reduction techniques, including
contract provisions designed to give insureds a financial
incentive to lower their own risk.29 The cumulative effect of
such risk reduction is an overall reduction in societal risk. In
this way, insurance promotes social welfare.30 This idea—
promoting social welfare by reducing individual risk—animates
the drive to use liability insurance to improve food safety. If
insurers can use the terms of a liability insurance contract to
induce food suppliers to lower their risk of transmitting foodborne
pathogens, society will benefit from an overall reduction in
foodborne illnesses. The critical question is: Will it work?
This article questions the notion that liability insurance
can serve as an effective regulator of food safety.31 While others
have questioned the effects of liability insurance on food safety,
they expressed their reservations in narrow terms. Buzby,
Frenzen, and Rasco, for example, suggest that liability insurance
distorts incentives to produce safe food by transforming the
expected risk of liability arising from foodborne illness into a
routine business expense.32 Relying on the traditional moral
hazard argument against liability insurance,33 they posit that
liability insurance leads to underinvestment in food safety by
insulating firms that grow, make, or distribute food products
from the full financial impact of the foodborne illnesses they
insurance-based incentives to control accident costs); George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice
Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN.
INS. L.J. 305, 325 (1997) (describing risk-reduction tools used in legal malpractice
insurance); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 60-62 (1970) (describing insurance
risk differentiation).
28 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 201 (arguing that private safety
regulation by insurance companies often outperforms government safety regulation).
29 See infra Section II.C.
30 Id. at 202.
31 Other insurance products, such as food recall insurance, do show some
promise for improving food safety. See Jerry R. Skees et al., The Potential for Recall
Insurance to Improve Food Safety, 4 INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 99
(2001); see also infra Part V.
32 BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
33 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 199 (“In much of the economic
literature, insurance is seen as antithetical to risk reduction. Indeed, one of the cornerstones
of the economics of information, regarded by many as axiomatic, is the moral hazard
problem—the idea that a party who is insured against risk has a suboptimal incentive to
reduce it.”).
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cause, even if the firm’s premium goes up due to a claim.34
Lytton and McAllister also express doubt about the ability of
liability insurance to effectively regulate food safety.35 Lytton
and McAllister point to variations in food safety hazards posed
by different food products and the difficulty in tracing foodborne
illness as significant impediments to insurers’ accurate assessment
of food safety risks.36 They also suggest that inaccurate pricing,
combined with aggressive marketing by insurers, leads to the type
of moral hazard concerns that Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco raise,
namely that food suppliers will simply treat foodborne illness as “a
cost of [doing] business” that is covered by insurance.37
This article takes a more comprehensive approach than
previous scholarship by systematically addressing the
shortcomings of liability insurance as a regulator of food safety
from three distinct perspectives: (1) an economics of information
framework, (2) an analysis of the empirical evidence of
underdeterrence of foodborne illness by the tort system, and (3)
a review of emerging evidence of food suppliers’ cognitive
biases with regard to food safety. Combined, these three
methodologically distinct approaches strongly suggest that food
safety liability insurance is a weak regulator of food safety.
The principal impediment to food safety liability insurance
as a regulator of food safety is an information problem in the
marketplace for safe food. Consumers are burdened by significant
informational asymmetries with respect to the food they eat.
Possessing less information than the farmers, processors,
transporters, retailers and others who grow, handle, prepare, and
sell food, consumers cannot fully discern risky food from safe
food. Was the food dropped on the floor? Was it exposed to
contaminants or pathogens? Consumers almost never know.
Furthermore, the nature of foodborne illness creates its own
information problems. The period of time between infection by
34 See BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 9, 10-11, 26; see also Jean C. Buzby &
Paul D. Frenzen, Food Safety and Product Liability, 24 FOOD POL’Y 637, 649 (1999).
35 See Timothy D. Lytton & Lesley K. McAllister, Oversight in Private Food
Safety Auditing: Addressing Auditor Conflict of Interest, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 289 (2014).
36 Id. at 312 (“Pricing such risks is a challenge for even the most sophisticated
and experienced underwriters.”).
37 Id. at 312-13. Lytton and McAllister also suggest that the dynamics of the
litigation process and presence of multiple layers of insurance coverage blunt
insurance’s ability to allocate responsibility for a foodborne illness, thereby diminishing
the regulatory capacity of liability insurance. Id. at 313; see also Tetty Havinga, The
Influence of Liability Law on Food Safety 21 (Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working
Papers Series 2010/02, 2010), http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/91432/
91432.pdf [http://perma.cc/NX5U-29PA] (reviewing the literature and concluding that
“[i]nsurance companies [in the European Union] do not seem to encourage prevention
of food safety risks”).
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a pathogen and the onset of symptoms is variable. Some
foodborne illnesses take a few hours to develop, while others
can take a week or more.38 This not only makes it harder for
victims of foodborne illness to link their sickness to a particular
food, but the passage of time increases the likelihood that
evidence of the contaminated food (i.e., the leftovers) will be
unavailable for testing—thereby severing the empirical
connection between the illness and its food source.
The consequences of these information problems are
significant. The marketplace for food safety is beset by moral
hazard and adverse selection problems that incentivize food
suppliers to shirk on food safety. And because individuals
suffering from foodborne illness are often unable to connect
their sickness to a specific food or food supplier, there are
considerable causation hurdles to tort liability. The result is
underdeterrence by the tort system, reflected in an astonishingly
low rate of litigation arising from foodborne illnesses. Since
liability insurance relies on tort damages (and settlements) to
spread risk and force insureds to internalize the costs of the
risks they take, the underdeterrence problem significantly
impedes the effectiveness of food safety liability insurance as a
regulator of food safety. Finally, there is emerging evidence
that cognitive biases contribute to the food safety problem by
causing food suppliers to both overestimate their ability to
control and underestimate their risk of spreading foodborne
illnesses. Thus, while liability insurance is capable in many
instances of improving public safety and can even outperform
weak or flawed government regulatory schemes in some
instances,39 food safety problems provide a vivid counterexample
to the regulatory power of liability insurance.
This article, however, should not be read as necessarily
advocating for the complete elimination of food safety liability
insurance. Instead, it is intended to stimulate a more robust
discussion of the merits and costs of food safety liability insurance
and how (and whether) food safety liability insurance should
figure into the larger debate about how best to address the
problem of food safety.
The article proceeds in five parts. After first describing
how foodborne diseases are transmitted, Part I turns to federal
and local government agencies and explains why they are
See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
See generally Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17 (arguing that private
insurers often outperform government agencies as safety regulators because insurers
possess superior information and are driven by competitive pressures).
38

39
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unable to stop the spread of foodborne illnesses. These
agencies, which still rely heavily on inspection of facilities and
food as a means of ensuring food safety, are beset by three
main problems: they are fragmented, insufficiently funded, and
lack adequate enforcement powers. As a result of these
deficiencies, and in light of the significant risks posed by tainted
food, many food suppliers (and governments) have turned to
private market risk-reduction services, like liability insurance,
as a means to improve food safety.
Part II explains how liability insurance functions as a
regulator of risk, the techniques insurers use to lower risk, and
the conditions that must be met before liability insurance can
successfully reduce risk. One of those conditions is sufficient
tort liability. Liability insurance can only deter harm if premiums
are sufficient to cause insureds to internalize the costs of the
risks they take. If premiums are low because tort liability is rare,
then liability insurance cannot regulate risk. As it turns out, low
tort liability is the Achilles heel of food safety liability insurance
due to the information difficulties in the market for safe food.
Part III examines the information problems that plague
the market for safe food. Using an economics of information
framework, the analysis describes the asymmetry of information
that exists between consumers and food suppliers, the significant
lag time between the ingestion of a foodborne pathogen and the
onset of a foodborne illness, the moral hazard problem that
motivates food suppliers to shirk on food safety, and the
adverse selection problem that promotes a food safety “race to
the bottom.” Part III concludes with an explanation of how
cognitive biases cause food suppliers to underestimate their
own risk of causing a foodborne illness.
Part IV describes the severe underdeterrence problem
for foodborne illness tort claims and explains how this problem
limits the effectiveness of food safety liability insurance as a risk
regulator. Part V then briefly addresses some additional risks
associated with food safety liability insurance, including the
potential to increase moral hazard, send false signals regarding
the risk of foodborne illness, and diminish demand for more
effective means to control foodborne illnesses.
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I.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION OF FOOD SAFETY

A.

The Dangers of Foodborne Illness

Although our food supply is often touted as “one of the
safest in the world,”40 millions of Americans are sickened each
year and thousands die as a direct result of eating unsafe
food.41 Undoubtedly, our highly complex food chain contributes
to the problem. Foodborne pathogens can infect food at any
point in the production and distribution process. Contamination
can occur at a farm,42 during transport,43 at a processing plant,44
in a restaurant,45 in a supermarket,46 or even in our own homes.47
40 See Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Infections from
Some Foodborne Germs Increased, While Others Remained Unchanged in 2012 (Apr.
18, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0418-foodborne-germs.html [http://
perma.cc/EYM4-ZBNM] (quoting CDC Director Tom Frieden).
41 Estimates of Foodborne Illness, supra note 2.
42 See, e.g., CAL. FOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, INVESTIGATION OF AN
ESCHERICHIA COLI O157:H7 OUTBREAK ASSOCIATED WITH DOLE PRE-PACKAGED SPINACH 34 (2007), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/pubsforms/Documents/fdb%20eru%20Spnch%20EC%
20Dole032007wph.PDF [http://perma.cc/NH8J-2GQR] (finding presence of wild pigs in and
around spinach fields and in the proximity of irrigation wells as a potential cause of a 2006
multistate outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 that resulted in 205 confirmed illnesses and
three deaths). Leafy green vegetables such as lettuce and spinach are often the source of
foodborne illness. See Bill Marler, Yet Another Leafy Green E. coli Outbreak and No
Traceback to the Farm, MARLER BLOG (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.marlerblog.com/legalcases/yet-another-leafy-green-e-coli-outbreak-and-no-traceback-to-the-farm/#.VcT_Drd4hpk
[http://perma.cc/LZ5Y-XAYY] (compiling list of 26 E. coli outbreaks linked to fresh leafy
green vegetables from 1995 to 2011).
43 See Michael R. Taylor, Keeping Foods Safe During Transport, FDA VOICE
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/01/keeping-foods-safe-duringtransport/ [http://perma.cc/8U9E-HLPM] (FDA’s Deputy Commissioner noted that
while uncommon, food transporters “can introduce contamination even after proper
safeguards have been taken by the food producers and processors”).
44 See, e.g., Tom Watkins, Cargill Recalls 36 Million Pounds of Ground
Turkey, CNN (Aug. 4, 2011, 8:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/08/03/turkey.
recall/ [https://perma.cc/R6ZZ-T2ZJ] (noting that “an outbreak of multi-drug-resistant
Salmonella Heidelberg that . . . killed one person and sickened 76 others . . . appears to
have been traced to ground turkey products” produced at a Cargill facility in
Springdale, Arkansas). Although there are over 2,000 different strains of Salmonella,
the five most common are Salmonella Enteritidis, Salmonella Typhimurium, Salmonella
Newport, Salmonella Javiana, and Salmonella Heidelberg. Sam Robinson, The Big
Five: Most Common Salmonella Strains in Foodborne Illness Outbreaks, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/08/the-five-most-commonsalmonella-strains/#.VuhmTxj1ZKo [http://perma.cc/6X62-7Z6X].
45 See, e.g., 35 Sick After Eating at Hacienda Don Villo in Channahon, IL,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/10/35-sick-aftereating-at-hacienda-don-villo-in-il/#.VcUEjrd4hpl [http://perma.cc/5X6M-WP35] (Salmonella
outbreak traced to restaurant).
46 See, e.g., 70 Sickened in May WI Salmonella Outbreak Linked to Pork
Carnitas, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 30, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/07/
70-sickened-in-wisconsin-salmonella-outbreak-linked-to-pork-carnitas/#.VcUFXLd4hpk
[http://perma.cc/EZ8N-63V9] (describing Salmonella outbreak traced to supermarket).
47 Elizabeth Scott, Food Safety and Foodborne Disease in 21st Century
Homes, 14 CAN. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 277, 277 (2003) (“[I]t is now accepted that
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Industrialized food production,48 long supply chains,49 and market
pressures to reduce food production costs50 all increase the risk of
contamination by foodborne pathogens. As food processing and
shipping systems have continually grown larger and more
efficient,51 foodborne illnesses have become a national problem.
The main causal mechanism for these foodborne diseases
is inadequate handling of food and its ingredients, including
improper storage, improper preparation, cross-contamination,
and improper hygiene by food handlers.52 And while most
foodborne illnesses are not connected to an outbreak,53 outbreaks
of foodborne illnesses are common. On average, over 1,200
outbreaks are reported to the CDC each year.54 Many of these
outbreaks are large-scale, affecting tens or hundreds of victims.
In 2014, for example, caramel apples contaminated with
Listeria monocytogenes sickened 35 people in 12 states and
killed 7,55 cilantro contaminated with Cyclospora sickened 304
many cases of foodborne illness occur as a result of improper food handling and
preparation by consumers in their own kitchens.”).
48 Concentrated animal feeding operations, so-called factory farms, contribute
to the spread of antibiotic resistant bacteria. See Amanda Belanger, Note, A Holistic
Solution for Antibiotic Resistance: Phasing Out Factory Farms in Order to Protect
Human Health, 11 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 145, 147-56 (2015).
49 Long supply chains inhibit the traceability of foodborne illnesses. See
William Fisher, The Importance of Food Traceability, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/03/the-importance-of-food-traceability/#.Vc
jkBbd4hpk [http://perma.cc/94WH-TVXX].
50 See infra Section III.A.4.
51 See Joseph A. Levitt, FDA’s Foods Program, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 255,
255-56 (2001).
52 Diogo Thimoteo da Cunha et al., Food Safety of Food Services Within the
Destinations of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil: Development and Reliability
Assessment of the Official Evaluation Instrument, 57 FOOD RES. INT’L 95, 96 (2014);
Ewen C. D. Todd et al., Outbreaks Where Food Workers Have Been Implicated In the
Spread of Foodborne Disease. Part 3. Factors Contributing to Outbreaks and
Description of Outbreak Categories, 70 J. FOOD PROTECTION 2199, 2199-201 (2007).
53 An “outbreak [of foodborne illness] occurs when two or more people get the
same illness from the same contaminated food or drink.” Tracking and Reporting
Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 3,
2014) [hereinafter Foodborne Illness and Outbreak], http://www.cdc.gov/features/ds
foodborneoutbreaks/ [http://perma.cc/BE9K-SKFG]. Foodborne illnesses not part of an
outbreak are called “sporadic.” Foodborne Outbreak Tracking and Reporting, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/fdoss/
faq/ [http://perma.cc/6HWG-D3K9].
54 L. Hannah Gould et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Surveillance for
Foodborne Disease Outbreaks—United States, 1998-2008, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. tbl.2 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6202a1.htm?s_
cid=ss6202a1_w [http://perma.cc/3FV9-RL9Z] (stating that there were 13,405 foodborne
disease outbreaks reported to the CDC during an 11-year period from 1998 to 2008,
averaging just over 1,218 per year).
55 Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Commercially Produced,
Prepackaged Caramel Apples Made from Bidart Bros. Apples (Final Update), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 12, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/
outbreaks/caramel-apples-12-14/index.html [http://perma.cc/AT8D-F4Q7].
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people,56 gravy contaminated with Clostridium perfringens
sickened more than 300 guests at a Missouri wedding,57
Salmonella-tainted raw chicken sickened 634 people in 29 states
and Puerto Rico,58 and chicken contaminated with Clostridium
perfringens sickened 216, ironically, at a food safety conference
in Baltimore.59 But that’s not all. Massive, nationwide recalls of
tainted food products are commonplace,60 and consumer groups
and the media regularly investigate food safety issues and
provide vivid, often lurid, details of unsafe food. Typical of
these reports is the 2014 Consumer Reports investigation of
supermarket chicken. Consumer Reports sampled hundreds of
supermarket chicken breasts across the country and found that
97% were contaminated with a variety of illness-causing
pathogens, including multidrug-resistant bacteria. The report
also found that “[m]ore than half of the [chicken breast] samples
contained fecal contaminants.”61
There can be little doubt that our food safety regulatory
system bears substantial blame for our unsafe food supply.
Comprised of over a dozen federal agencies and thousands of
56 Cyclosporiasis Outbreak Investigations—United States, 2014, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 19, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/parasites/
cyclosporiasis/outbreaks/2014/ [http://perma.cc/E8N7-E2JF].
57 More Than 300 Sickened at Missouri Wedding, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May
15, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/05/300-sickened-at-mo-wedding/#.VcWKHb
d4hpk [http://perma.cc/5UHH-F8PF].
58 Multistate
Outbreak of Multidrug-Resistant Salmonella Heidelberg
Infections Linked to Foster Farms Brand Chicken (Final Update), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 31, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/
heidelberg-10-13/index.html [http://perma.cc/MDU2-4YT9] (stating that there were 634
cases reported from March 1, 2013, to July 11, 2014, with 218 in 2014).
59 Dan Flynn, Report: Chicken on Menu at 2014 Food Safety Summit Was
Contaminated, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/
2014/09/c-perfringens-in-c/#.VJh06sAOA [http://perma.cc/82RV-U5HC].
60 See, e.g., Austin Ramzy, Blue Bell Recalls All Products After Listeria
Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/business/
blue-bell-recalls-all-products-after-listeria-outbreak.html [http://perma.cc/FP6U-APD2]
(ice cream manufacturer recalled all its products due to Listeria contamination); Rachel
Abrams, Listeria in Sabra Hummus Prompts New Wave of Recalls, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/business/listeria-in-sabra-hummus-prompts
-new-wave-of-recalls.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/T5JT-WBFC] (30,000 cases of hummus
recalled after tests revealed Listeria); 3 Organic Food Companies Recall Products Over
Listeria Fears, CBS PHILLY (Mar. 24, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/
2015/03/24/3-organic-food-companies-recall-products-over-listeria-fears/ [http://perma.
cc/6TPD-EVBQ] (organic food company recalled about 74,000 cases of frozen and
prepackaged products containing spinach due to Listeria).
61 Dangerous Contaminated Chicken, CONSUMER REP. (Jan. 2014), http://
www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/02/the-high-cost-of-cheap-chicken/index.
htm [http://perma.cc/6T58-44SJ]. Ground beef also contains feces. See ERIC SCHLOSSER,
FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 197 (2001) (noting that
more than three-quarters of ground beef sampled in 1996 by the USDA contained microbes
spread by fecal matter and concluding that “[there is] a simple explanation for why eating
hamburger meat can now make you seriously ill: There is shit in the meat”).
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local health departments, our massive food safety system may
appear robust, but continuing high rates of foodborne illnesses
suggest otherwise.
B.

Federal Food Safety Regulation

Primary responsibility for our food safety rests with the
federal government, which is responsible for regulating, inspecting,
and enforcing safety standards for the bulk of the foods and
beverages we consume.62 Despite massive federal spending on food
safety63 and multiple federal agencies devoted to ensuring the
safety of our food, the effectiveness of our food safety system is
hampered by three significant problems: fragmented oversight,
limited funding, and insufficient enforcement authority.
1. Fragmentation
Fragmentation is the hallmark of our federal food safety
system.64 As one observer put it, our food safety system is “a
regulatory monstrosity of a dozen poorly coordinated federal
agencies that give the illusion of comprehensive coverage but in
reality are woefully inadequate to the task of protecting the
nation’s food supply.”65 Together, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and USDA (and its component agencies66)
are responsible for the vast majority of federal food safety

62 Congress has the authority to regulate food in interstate commerce, but
states retain authority over food solely sold within the state. Weigle v. Curtice Bros.
Co., 248 U.S. 285, 288 (1919).
63 For example, the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service’s fiscal year
2015 budget was just over $1 billion. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FY 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY
AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 57 (2013), http://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/FY15
budsum.pdf [http://perma.cc/FVV8-MKZS].
64 The federal food safety network has always been fragmented. Beginning
with the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat.
768 (1906) (repealed 1938), and the Federal Meat Inspection Act in 1907, Pub. L. No.
59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (2014)), the federal
government’s food safety structure has been divided among different agencies. For a
brief history of fragmentation in the federal food safety systems, see Note, Reforming
the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1345,
1347-51 (2007).
65 See Helena Bottemiller Evich, Why President Obama and Congress Turned
Their Backs on Food Safety, POLITICO (July 14, 2015, 5:16 AM), http://www.politico.
com/story/2015/07/sickness-in-the-system-120057.html [http://perma.cc/E4F9-R7TT].
66 These include, among others, the Agricultural Marketing Service, Grain
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, and Food Safety and Inspection Service. See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM: A PRIMER 14-15, apps. A, B
(2014) http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22600.pdf [http://perma.cc/RC5F-TUNJ] (listing
federal agencies and their responsibilities).
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activities.67 The FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of
all domestic and imported food products, except for most meats
and poultry, but does have regulatory authority over intact
eggs (so-called shell eggs). The FDA also regulates animal drugs
and animal feed.68 The USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) regulates most meat, poultry, and egg products
(that is, anything made from eggs).69 Various USDA component
agencies are responsible for other food safety and quality
activities, such as grading the quality of eggs, dairy, meat, and
poultry products.70 State and local governments work with
federal agencies to perform inspections and other food safety
activities.71 Regulation of restaurants, supermarkets, food
trucks, and other retail food establishments is left to the
states.72 Food safety responsibilities have also been delegated
to other federal agencies. In all, 15 federal agencies implement
30 major food safety statutes.73
This crazy quilt system has come under harsh criticism
from the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) for its
inability to coordinate food safety efforts. According to the
GAO, fragmented federal oversight of food safety “has caused
inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient
use of resources.”74 For example, in a 2011 report, the GAO
pointed to a recall of 500 million Salmonella-tainted eggs and
egg products to highlight the lack of federal food safety
67 See id. at 1 (noting that “[f]ederal responsibility for food safety rests primarily
with the Food and Drug Administration . . . and the Food Safety and Inspection Service [],
which is part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture”).
68 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-19A, FOOD SAFETY AND
QUALITY: WHO DOES WHAT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 4 (1990) [hereinafter GAO
Report, WHO DOES WHAT], http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/213518.pdf [http://perma.cc/D3SSAGTU].
69 See JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 5-6.
70 See id. Multiple component agencies within the USDA have oversight over
various aspects of the meat, poultry, and dairy industries. For example, the Food
Safety and Inspection Service oversees all domestic and imported meat, poultry, and
processed egg products; the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service oversees the
health of agricultural sources; the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration establishes inspection and quality guidelines for grain; the Agricultural
Marketing Service establishes standards for dairy, fruit, vegetable, livestock, meat,
poultry, and egg products; and the Agricultural Research Service conducts food safety
research. And the list goes on. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-549T,
OVERSEEING THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO REDUCE
OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 21 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-05-549T [http://perma.cc/SF8P-7YNU].
71 See JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 1.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 1-2; see also id. at 14-15, apps. A, B.
74 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-08-794, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED
COUNTRIES’ SYSTEMS CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND
RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE ILLNESS 2 (2008) [hereinafter FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED
COUNTRIES], http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08794.pdf [http://perma.cc/8KDP-U8LJ].
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coordination.75 The eggs subject to the recall were implicated in
an outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis that likely sickened
nearly 2,000 people.76 As the GAO pointed out, no single agency
was in charge of the eggs or the facility the eggs came from,
and there was no coordination between the many agencies that
played a role in ensuring the safety of the eggs.77 While the
FDA was responsible for the eggs that remained in their shells,
the FSIS was responsible for the safety of eggs that had been
processed into egg products. The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) is responsible for grading the eggs (i.e., “Grade
A”), but it does not test eggs for pathogens such as Salmonella.78
Once the Salmonella outbreak occurred, the FDA investigation
uncovered unsanitary conditions at several of the egg supplier’s
facilities, “including dead chickens, rodents and towers of
manure.”79 Yet shortly before the outbreak, the AMS had been at
the same facilities to perform egg-grading services.80 Although
aware of the deplorable conditions at the facility, the AMS
never informed the FDA of the conditions at the facilities. That
was not their job.81
Despite obvious problems resulting from fragmentation
of authority, Congress has not seen fit to consolidate the federal
food safety system. Recent federal legislation enacted in 2011 in
response to a rash of outbreaks82 has not improved the situation.
The FSMA83 was intended to modernize food safety and revamp
outdated regulations,84 but it has done nothing to address the

75 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO
REDUCE POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND
ENHANCE REVENUE 8 (2011) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES], http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d11318sp.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZY6L-FQAS].
76 Multistate
Outbreak of Human Salmonella Enteritidis Infections
Associated with Shell Eggs (Final Update), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Dec. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Associated with Eggs],
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/enteritidis/ [http://perma.cc/4VAG-LYJA].
77 See OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 75, at 8.
78 See id.
79 Employee at Maine Egg Farm Killed by Coworker, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/08/employee-at-maine-egg-farmkilled-by-coworker/#.VEQhf9apqRc [http://perma.cc/DS5Q-HTEK].
80 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 50601-000123, USDA CONTROLS OVER SHELL EGG INSPECTIONS 11-13, 13 n.42, 17-18 (2012), http://
www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-0001-23.pdf [http://perma.cc/6WJS-5WQN].
81 Id.
82 See Gregory M. Schieber, Note, The Food Safety Modernization Act’s Tester
Amendment: Useful Safe Harbor for Small Farmers and Food Facilities or Weak
Attempt at Scale-Appropriate Farm and Food Regulations?, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 239,
240-41 (2013) (listing outbreaks).
83 21 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
84 See Schieber, supra note 82, at 244-45.
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fragmentation problem85 and, in fact, has only affected the
operations of one agency, the FDA.86 As a result of these and
other problems, food safety oversight remains on the GAO’s
“high-risk” list, which is a compilation of government agencies
and program areas “that are high risk” and “are [most] in need
of transformation.”87
2. Inadequate Funding
Federal food safety programs have long been
underfunded,88 leaving both the FDA and the FSIS with
insufficient funding for food safety inspection and enforcement.89
But there is also a strikingly unequal allocation of funding. The
FDA, which currently oversees 80%–90% of the food supply90
and is responsible for the food associated with twice as many
outbreaks as FSIS-regulated food,91 receives less than half the
available funding. On the other hand, the FSIS is responsible
for only 10%–20% of our food supply,92 but it receives
approximately 60% of the total food safety budget allocated to
both agencies.93
Over the years, Congress has increased the FDA’s
duties through the enactment of more than 100 new laws, but

85 Diana R. H. Winters, Not Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and
Barriers to Justiciability, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 905, 906 n.9 (2012) (stating that the
FSMA “does not . . . address the inefficiencies or inconsistencies caused by the fact that
multiple agencies have authority over food regulation”).
86 See JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 5.
87 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN
UPDATE 1, 262-66 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9F9F-RJ3B].
88 See Michael R. Taylor & Sandra A. Hoffmann, Redesigning Food Safety,
ISSUES (2001), http://issues.org/17-4/p_taylor/ [http://perma.cc/662G-RU5K] (noting in
2001 that “[t]he FDA’s food safety program is so severely underfunded that it cannot
even afford to analyze risk priorities systematically”).
89 See JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 9; see also Dennis G. Maki, Coming to
Grips with Foodborne Infection—Peanut Butter, Peppers, and Nationwide Salmonella
Outbreaks, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 952 (2009) (noting that prior to the adoption of
the FSMA, the FDA and the USDA were already limited in their ability to complete
inspections “by insufficient personnel and inadequate budgetary support”).
90 See JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 9.
91 See CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, OUTBREAK ALERT! 2008:
CLOSING THE GAPS IN OUR FEDERAL FOOD-SAFETY NET i (2008) [hereinafter CLOSING
THE GAPS], http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/outbreak_alert_2008_report_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5HHP-289Z]. Although the text of the report refers to the USDA, the products covered
by the report’s analysis are beef, pork, poultry, and other meats regulated by the FSIS.
See id. at 19, app. A (listing foodborne outbreaks and illnesses from 1990 to 2006 by
federal agency and food categories).
92 See JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 9.
93 See id.
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Congress has not increased the FDA’s budget to keep pace.94
The FSMA further increases the FDA’s responsibilities, but
funding remains insufficient,95 leaving the FDA unable to
modernize its inspection processes, retrain inspectors and staff
members to meet new requirements, and properly oversee food
imports.96 But the FSIS is no better off. Its budget has also failed
to keep pace,97 with most of its funding going towards its
outdated requirement that meat and poultry processors be
physically inspected.98
3. Lack of Sufficient Enforcement Authority
The third major problem with our food safety system is
the lack of enforcement authority. Both the FDA and the FSIS
are hamstrung in their ability to take action to protect the food
we eat. The FDA, which was recently given a much-needed
regulatory tool, mandatory food recall authority,99 has only a
fraction of the inspectors it needs to oversee the hundreds of
thousands of facilities it is charged with inspecting.100 Meanwhile,
the FSIS, which has more than one inspector for every one of
the thousands of facilities it covers—a vestige of the system of
organoleptic inspection101 that has been in place for over 100
94 Kristin Choo, Hungry for Change, 95 A.B.A. J. 56, 60 (2009) (noting that
“Congress has adopted some 120 new laws that have expanded the FDA’s responsibilities
without commensurate increases in funding”).
95 See Evich, supra note 65 (noting that almost five years after passage of the
FSMA, “funding is more than $276 million behind where it needs to be”); William
Neuman, On Food Safety, a Long List but Little Money, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/business/with-a-long-list-and-short-on-money-fda-t
ackles-food-safety.html?scp=5&sq=%22food%20safety%22%20fund&st=cse [http://perm
a.cc/6C9H-CQ8L]; Ron Nixon, Funding Gap Hinders Law for Ensuring Food Safety,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/food-safety-lawsfunding-is-far-below-estimated-requirement.html [http://perma.cc/PXR6-B8H4].
96 See Nixon, supra note 95.
97 See Choo, supra note 94, at 60 (noting that meat and poultry consumption
in the United States doubled from 1981 to 2007, but the FSIS budget increased only 25%).
98 Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 100-02 (2000).
99 See Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350l (2012).
100 See Evich, supra note 65 (noting that in 2009, the FDA’s Office of
Regulatory Affairs had fewer than 700 inspectors, yet was responsible for inspecting
hundreds of thousands of food facilities).
101 Organoleptic inspection is a static, physical inspection process.

Inspectors from the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service [ ] generally
conduct post-mortem inspections while stationed at fixed points along the
slaughter processing line. Using organoleptic methods, that is, relying on
sight, touch and smell, the inspectors examine the head, viscera, and exterior
of each carcass for signs of adulteration, such as tumors, inflammation,
parasites, and other diseases . . . . The method of inspection just described
had remained unchanged for decades.
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Glickman, 215 F.3d 7, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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years102—does not have recall authority and cannot require the
recall of contaminated meat or poultry.
Perhaps more striking is the FSIS’s anemic approach to
enforcement. The FSIS inspection process is not designed to
stop meat and poultry infected with pathogens like Salmonella
and Listeria from entering the marketplace.103 Indeed, the FSIS
takes the position that it is not required to ensure that meat
and poultry are free from deadly pathogens.104 Instead, the
FSIS places this responsibility on whomever prepares the meat
and poultry for human consumption.105 In other words, the
FSIS takes the position that consumers are ultimately
responsible for their own food safety.106
The consequences of the FSIS’s astonishing tolerance for
pathogenic contamination and lack of recall authority can be
seen in the 2013–2014 outbreak of multidrug-resistant
102 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in
Public-Health Policymaking, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 471, 490-91 (2014).
103 See id. at 491.
104 Thomas O. McGarity, Federal Regulation of Mad Cow Disease Risks, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 289, 313 (2005). The USDA, through its component agency the FSIS,
ensures that meat is not “adulterated” and labels meat as “Inspected and Passed” prior
to its sale. See id. at 312. “Adulterated” animal carcasses cannot receive an “inspected
and passed” label and cannot be sold. See 21 U.S.C. § 604 (2012) (adulterated carcasses
must be marked “[i]nspected and condemned” and must be “destroyed for food
purposes . . . in the presence of an inspector”). However, meat contaminated by
Salmonella is not considered adulterated and can be sold. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v.
Butz, 511 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concluding that the USDA’s inspection labels
on meat sent to market “[are] not false or misleading because of the possibility that
salmonellae may be present in the poultry products inspected”). Indeed, the potentially
deadly pathogen Salmonella is not considered an adulterant. See id. at 334-35 (noting
that “the presence of Salmonella . . . does not constitute adulteration”); see also
Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001)
(observing that Salmonella is not a per se adulterant). At the time of the Butz case, the
USDA did not consider any pathogens in meat an adulterant. Since then, the USDA
has declared E. coli O157:H7 an adulterant in raw, nonintact beef products (i.e.,
ground beef) as well as raw, intact components used to manufacture nonintact
products. See Tex. Food Indus. Ass’n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 145, 149 (W.D. Tex.
1994) (upholding the declaration of E. coli O157:H7 as an adulterant). Six additional
strains of E. coli have since been declared adulterants. See Shiga Toxin-Producing
Escherichia coli in Certain Raw Beef Products, 77 Fed. Reg. 31,975, 31,975 (May 31,
2012) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 416, 417, 430). These strains of E. coli are the only
pathogens the FSIS considers adulterants. In 2014, the FSIS rejected a request that it
declare certain antibiotic-resistant strains of Salmonella adulterants. Letter from
Daniel L. Engeljohn, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Policy and Program Dev., FSIS, to
Sarah Klein & Caroline Smith DeWaal, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest (July 31,
2014), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/73037007-59d6-4b47-87b7-2748edaa1
d3e/FSIS-response-CSPI-073114.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [http://perma.cc/73TC-9ECU].
105 See Butz, 511 F.2d at 334 (noting that the USDA stated in a letter dated
August 18, 1971, that “the American consumer knows that raw meat and poultry are
not sterile and, if handled improperly, perhaps could cause illness”). The court
concluded that “American housewives and cooks normally are not ignorant or stupid
and their methods of preparing and cooking of food do not ordinarily result in
salmonellosis.” Id.
106 Id.
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Salmonella linked to Foster Farms chicken. Both the FSIS and
Foster Farms were aware that tainted chicken was being
shipped from Foster Farms for years before Foster Farms
finally initiated a voluntary recall.107 The outbreak resulted in
634 confirmed cases of Salmonella Heidelberg108 infection
nationwide, with 242 people hospitalized.109 While no firm
estimates exist, the number sickened during this outbreak likely
exceeded 18,000.110
C.

State and Local Food Safety Regulation

The situation is no better at the local level. In many
respects, local governments represent the first line of defense
against foodborne illnesses.111 “State and local governments
have the main responsibility for food produced or sold within
their borders.”112 State and local health departments inspect
grocery stores and retail food establishments, provide technical
assistance to food suppliers, educate consumers about food safety,
implement food safety standards for certain foods manufactured
within state borders, identify outbreaks, and investigate cases of
suspected foodborne illness.113 Thus, state and local governments
are the principal regulatory actors responsible for inspecting
restaurants to control foodborne illness.114 This oversight is

107 See Lynne Terry, A Game of Chicken: USDA Repeatedly Blinked When
Facing Salmonella Outbreaks Involving Foster Farms, OREGONLIVE.COM (May 1, 2015),
http://www.oregonlive.com/usda-salmonella/ [http://perma.cc/98CB-P4EM].
108 Salmonella Heidelberg is one of the most common strains of Salmonella
associated with foodborne illness. See Robinson, supra note 44.
109 See supra note 58.
110 See NRDC, FOSTER FARMS SPREAD ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANT BACTERIA
AROUND THE NATION, SICKENING HUNDREDS 1 (2014), http://www.nrdc.org/food/savingantibiotics/files/foster-farms-antibiotic-overuse-FS.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J7J8-MSG8].
This figure is based on the CDC’s estimate that there are 29 undiagnosed cases of
Salmonella for every diagnosed case. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
FOOD SAFETY PROGRESS REPORT FOR 2012 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/features/ds
foodnet2012/food-safety-progress-report-2012-508c.pdf [http://perma.cc/7MCB-YNGS].
111 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE TO FOODBORNE ILLNESS OUTBREAKS (2009), http://www.fda.gov/Food/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm180323.htm#statelocal [http://perma.cc/WZP4-ENDW];
INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY: THE ROLE OF THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 43, 50-51 (Robert B. Wallace & Maria Oria eds.,
2010) [hereinafter ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY].
112 ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY, supra note 111, at 1 n.2.
113 Id. at 50-51.
114 Kevin S. Murphy et al., Does Mandatory Food Safety Training and
Certification for Restaurant Employees Improve Inspection Outcomes?, 30 INT’L J.
HOSP. MGMT. 150, 151 (2011) (noting that state and local government inspectors are
the “primary regulatory agents to conduct routine restaurant inspections as a strategic
tool to reduce or eliminate all the risk factors associated with foodborne illnesses”).
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especially important since the “majority of food contamination
episodes happen away from home.”115
Yet food safety remains a significant problem at
restaurants, where there is ample evidence of unsanitary and
dangerous food handling practices. For example, there is evidence
of pervasive high-risk “ground beef handling policies and
practices in restaurants” that increase the risk of E. coli
contamination;116 many restaurants do not properly cook or
handle chicken;117 restaurant managers lack knowledge of proper
food safety practices for handling and preparing chicken;118 highrisk egg-preparation practices in restaurants are prevalent;119
inadequate food cooling policies and practices appear to be
common;120 improper handling of fresh vegetables and fruit is
commonplace;121 and food workers regularly work while sick122
and do not exercise safe hygiene practices.123 Furthermore,
periodic restaurant inspections appear to be an ineffective way to
promote food safety. Rates of inspections vary across

115 Maria L. Loureiro, Liability and Food Safety Provision: Empirical Evidence
from the US, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 204, 206 (2008).
116 See April K. Bogard et al., Ground Beef Handling and Cooking Practices in
Restaurants in Eight States, 76 J. FOOD PROTECTION 2132, 2132 (2013) (mentioning a
study of “ground beef handling policies and practices” in over 300 restaurants in eight
states, in which researchers found pervasive high-risk “ground beef handling policies
and practices in restaurants” that increased the risk of E. coli).
117 Laura Green Brown et al., Frequency of Inadequate Chicken CrossContamination Prevention and Cooking Practices in Restaurants, 76 J. FOOD
PROTECTION 2141, 2141 (2013).
118 Id. at 2144.
119 Robin Lee et al., Prevalence of High-Risk Egg-Preparation Practices in
Restaurants That Prepare Breakfast Egg Entrees: An EHS-Net Study, 67 J. FOOD
PROTECTION 1444 (2004) (finding that risky egg practices are common in restaurants).
120 Laura Green Brown et al., Restaurant Food Cooling Practices, 75 J. FOOD
PROTECTION 2172, 2175-76 (2012) (discussing the prevalence of inadequate food-cooling
policies and practices).
121 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kirkland et al., Tomato Handling Practices in
Restaurants, 72 J. FOOD PROTECTION 1692, 1692 (2009) (finding that unsafe tomatohandling practices are commonly observed in restaurants).
122 Steven Sumner et al., Factors Associated with Food Workers Working While
Experiencing Vomiting or Diarrhea, 74 J. FOOD PROTECTION 215, 215-16 (2011) (finding that
nearly 12% of restaurant workers worked while ill with vomiting or diarrhea in the previous
year); see also Daniel Victor, Chipotle Will Close Stores for Food Safety Meetings After
Outbreaks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/business/ch
ipotle-close-stores-e-coli-norovirus-outbreaks.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/W3MJ-JDZW]
(reporting that the restaurant chain Chipotle has admitted that foodborne illness
outbreaks that sickened hundreds of customers in California and Massachusetts were
caused by sick employees).
123 Laura R. Green et al., Factors Related to Food Worker Hand Hygiene
Practices, 70 J. FOOD PROTECTION 661 (2007); Laura R. Green et al., Food Worker
Hand Washing Practices: An Observation Study, 69 J. FOOD PROTECTION 2417 (2006)
(food workers wash hands less than one-third of the time necessary when engaging in
activities for which hand washing is recommended).
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jurisdictions,124 and inspections are often improperly conducted
or not conducted at all.125 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that local restaurant inspections can be unreliable and
uninformative to consumers due to flawed implementation,
inconsistent application of standards, and gaming of results by
food vendors.126 And in any event, research indicates that
inspection results are not an accurate predictor of foodborne
illness outbreaks.127 In other words, a restaurant’s inspection
record is not a reliable indication of whether it will or will not
subsequently infect a patron with a foodborne illness.
124 See, e.g., Don Sapatkin, Restaurant Inspection Rates Vary by County,
PHILLY.COM (July 18, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-07-18/news/64539884_1_
inspection-reports-fewer-violations-food-safety [http://perma.cc/5K7X-GRQV] (noting
that Pennsylvania restaurant inspection rates vary by county).
125 See, e.g., Joel Grover & Matt Schrader, Food Poisoning, Filth Exposed at
Popular LA Restaurants, NBC S. CAL. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/
investigations/LA-County-Restaurants-Inspections-301592901.html [http://perma.cc/X
K5Z-8Q7G] (finding that Los Angeles County is failing to inspect many restaurants as
frequently as required, if at all); Joel Grover & Matt Schrader, Dirty Secret: Inspectors
Fail to Reveal Salmonella Outbreak at Popular Restaurant, NBC4 (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Dirty-Secret-Inspectors-Fail-to-RevealSalmonella-Outbreak-at-Popular-Restaurant-297615461.html [http://perma.cc/2ME5-G
REW] (noting that state and local health officials failed to inform public of Salmonella
outbreak at restaurant, leading to more illnesses).
126 See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 585-87 (2012); see also Stephanie K. Baer,
What That Restaurant Letter Grade Isn’t Telling You About Health and Cleanliness,
SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (June 25, 2015, 10:32 AM), http://www.sgvtribune.com/
lifestyle/20150625/what-that-restaurant-letter-grade-isnt-telling-you-about-health-andcleanliness [http://perma.cc/5FL2-XQUT] (noting that under the public grading system,
restaurants often earn the highest grades despite unsafe practices and conditions
uncovered during inspection).
127 See Timothy F. Jones et al., Restaurant Inspection Scores and Foodborne
Disease, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 688, 688-91 (2004) (noting that data from
167,574 restaurant inspections over a seven-year period in Tennessee failed to find a
difference in the mean inspection scores of restaurants experiencing foodborne disease
outbreaks from those restaurants with no reported outbreaks); Miguel A. Cruz et al.,
An Assessment of the Ability of Routine Restaurant Inspections to Predict Food-Borne
Outbreaks in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 821, 821-22 (2001)
(finding “that restaurant inspections in Miami–Dade County do not reliably identify
restaurants that are at increased risk of outbreaks of food-borne illness”); Alan D.
Penman et al., Failure of Routine Restaurant Inspections: Restaurant-Related
Foodborne Outbreaks in Alabama, 1992, and Mississippi, 1993, 58 J. ENVTL. HEALTH
23 (1996) (finding that “inspections alone cannot guarantee prevention of foodborne
illness outbreaks”). But see Kathleen Irwin et al., Results of Routine Restaurant
Inspections Can Predict Outbreaks of Foodborne Illness: The Seattle King County
Experience, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 586, 586, 589 (1989) (comparing 28 restaurants
that were associated with an outbreak and 56 control restaurants and finding that
“[r]estaurants with poor inspection scores and violations of proper temperature controls
of potentially hazardous foods were, respectively, five and ten times more likely to have
outbreaks than restaurants with better results”); Paul A. Simon et al., Impact of
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards on Foodborne-Disease Hospitalizations in Los Angeles
County, 67 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 32, 36 (2005) (finding inspections combined with public
posting of restaurant hygiene grades to be effective in reducing the incidence of
foodborne disease).
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Private Regulation of Food Safety and the Reduction of
Risk

In light of these problems, some food suppliers have
turned to private risk-control measures to assure the safety of
the food they sell. They do this out of fear; there have been
instances in which the market has imposed harsh sanctions on
a seller of tainted food.128 These private risk-control measures
take various forms. Large retailers with sufficient resources,
like Costco, undertake their own testing to ensure that the food
they purchase for resale is safe and properly labeled.129 Other
food suppliers, eager to provide assurances to increasingly
wary consumers, develop and implement their own standards,
which they then publicize. Purdue Farms, a national supplier
of chickens, recently announced its own food safety standard:
its chickens are no longer routinely treated with antibiotics.130
The routine use of antibiotics in chickens is believed to
contribute to the spread of antibiotic-resistant foodborne
pathogens,131 which is a significant consumer concern.132
Purdue’s strategy is simple: allay customers’ fears and increase
sales by promoting the safety of its chickens. But not all food
suppliers have the resources, capacity, or desire to take
matters into their own hands.
Others have turned to third parties to reduce their risk
of transmitting foodborne pathogens. Retailers like Wal-Mart and
Wegmans often require certifications from third-party food safety
inspectors prior to accepting food shipments from suppliers.133
128 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443-44 & n.17 (2010) (listing examples). In reality,
these cases are rare. Most cases of foodborne illness are never connected to a source.
See infra Section III.A.2.
129 See Karen Stabiner, Private Eyes in the Grocery Aisles, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/business/private-eyes-in-the-grocery-aisles.h
tml?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/SPU6-4UPD].
130 Stephanie Strom, Perdue Sharply Cuts Antibiotic Use in Chickens and Jabs
at Its Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/business/
perdue-and-the-race-to-end-antibiotic-use-in-chickens.html [http://perma.cc/6ZXY-RUDZ].
131 Alexander Zaitchik, Big Ag’s Big Lie: Factory Farms, Your Health and the
New Politics of Antibiotics, SALON (Jan. 12, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/
01/12/big_ags_big_lie_factory_farms_your_health_and_the_new_politics_of_antibiotics/
[http://perma.cc/9Q69-69JM].
132 David Kesmodel et al., Meat Companies Go Antibiotics-Free as More
Consumers Demand It, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/meat-companies-go-antibiotics-free-as-more-consumers-demand-it-1415071802
[http://perma.cc/J2LJ-XZ8N] (noting consumer concern with widespread use of
antibiotics and the industry’s response).
133 See Stephanie Armour et al., Food Sickens Millions as Company-Paid
Checks Find It Safe, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2012-10-11/food-sickens-millions-as-industry-paid-inspectors-find-itsafe [http://perma.cc/9JK3-98DD].
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These third-party certifications, which purport to provide an
independent assessment of the food safety practices of farmers
or food processors, appear to do what government inspectors do
not—provide independent and rigorous inspections of food to
ensure its safety.
While third-party certifications may appear to be an
effective response to weak government regulation, third-party
certifications are controversial for one simple reason: they lack
regulatory controls. Indeed, the Roman poet Juvenal’s famous
query, “Who will guard the guardians?”134 could also be asked of
the third-party certification process. Third-party certifiers are
not governed by any uniform standard, are not licensed or subject
to any oversight, and do not have to report their findings to
anyone except their paying customers, the food suppliers they
inspect.135 Unsurprisingly, there have been numerous instances in
which food suppliers implicated in outbreaks of foodborne illness
were awarded top safety ratings by third-party inspections
shortly before the outbreak.136 But that’s not all. There is also
an inherent conflict of interest in the third-party certification
process. Third-party verifiers are financially dependent on
their clients—the food suppliers. Not only does this undermine
confidence in the third-party certification process, it leads to
untrustworthy certifications.137 At bottom, the current private
certification process is highly problematic, offering an unverifiable
promise of safer food.138
134 See Salvato v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Rights, 155 F.3d 922, 923 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“[Q]uis custodiet ipsos custodes” (quoting the Roman scholar Juvenal)).
135 There are currently no standards for domestic third-party certifications in
the United States. The FDA, however, has promulgated rules providing for accreditation of
third-party certification bodies to conduct food safety audits of foreign food suppliers.
See Accreditation of Third-Party Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety Audits
and to Issue Certifications, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,570 (Nov. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 11, 16).
136 See, e.g., Michael Moss & Andrew Martin, Food Problems Elude Private
Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/business/
06food.html?_r=3&scp=4&sq=food%20safety&st=cse&
[http://perma.cc/V9TT-YYMS]
(noting that third-party auditors failed to detect problems at food plants whose
contaminated products later sickened and killed consumers); William Neuman, Listeria
Outbreak Traced to Cantaloupe Packing Shed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/10/20/business/listeria-outbreak-traced-to-colorado-cantaloupe-packi
ng-shed.html [http://perma.cc/QET3-RUQC] (noting that a private auditor had
inspected its facility days before a deadly outbreak).
137 See Lytton & McAllister, supra note 35, at 295 (noting that “[c]onflict of
interest is a structural feature of any private system of standards compliance in which the
auditor is paid by the entity being audited”); see also Moss & Martin, supra note 136.
138 See Stephanie Armour et al., supra note 133 (detailing instances of thirdparty inspections failing to detect problems). Despite the problems associated with
third-party certification, Lytton and McAllister argue that third-party certification can
provide benefits and offer strategies to reduce conflicts of interest and improve the
reliability of third-party certification and verifications. See Lytton & McAllister, supra
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There is, however, another third-party risk reduction
service that appears to overcome Juvenal’s concern: insurance.
Insurance differs from other third-party risk reduction services in
one significant respect. Insurers do not just assess risk, they bear
the financial responsibility for risks. Thus, unlike third-party
certifiers, insurers have a direct financial stake in ensuring that
risk is not only correctly assessed, but lowered. This difference
gives insurance a comparative advantage over other types of
third-party risk reduction services and makes insurance an
attractive option for private regulation of food safety risk.139
II.

INSURANCE AS PRIVATE REGULATION

There is risk in food. But the risk of foodborne illnesses
may seem no different than many other societal risks people
face every day. Yet when asked to identify a means to minimize
societal risk, few are likely to respond by shouting, “Insurance!”
This is not surprising. To most people, insurance is an
afterthought, a gray and dreary necessity of life. We need
insurance to drive. We need it to buy a house. We need insurance
so we don’t go broke when calamity strikes. This is how most
people typically think of insurance. But insurance does much
more than simply cover individual losses. Insurance can
regulate behavior—and in doing so can reduce risk in a socially
beneficial way. This is the allure of liability insurance as a
regulator of food safety—its potential to mitigate societal risks
associated with food.
A.

The Nature of Liability Insurance

Insurance is, at its core, a risk-spreading device.
Insurance is generally understood as an agreement to provide
indemnification for a loss; the insured pays an adequate
premium,140 and in exchange, the insurer provides coverage that
note 35; see also Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2012) (suggesting greater government reliance on third-party
certification to meet regulatory objectives).
139 As Tom Baker and Sean Griffith put it, insurers “bond their advice not
only with their reputation, but also with a commitment to pay their customers’ losses.
Thus . . . insurers have the best incentive to get that advice right and should have a
comparative advantage over other suppliers of loss prevention advice for this reason.”
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1818 (2007) (footnote omitted).
140 An adequate premium will cover the expected claims of the pool of
insureds, plus a loading charge to cover administrative expenses, taxes, other nonclaim-related costs, and provide a profit. For a concise explanation of how insurance
premiums are calculated, see John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Health Insurance Rate Review,
88 TEMPLE L. REV. 411, 431-32 (2016). An actuarially fair premium is equal to expected
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is designed to restore the insured to the same financial
condition that was enjoyed just prior to the loss.141 In order to
provide such coverage, the insurer must be able to accurately
predict losses. Yet an insurer cannot accurately predict the
fortuitous losses that will be incurred by any particular insured.
Instead, the insurer relies on the law of large numbers. If an
insurer provides coverage for a sufficiently large pool of insureds
whose expected losses are uniform and noncorrelated, the
aggregate claims of the group will equal the expected loss of
any individual insured in the pool multiplied by the number of
insureds in the pool.142 In other words, the expected total risk of
a pool is distributed among the individuals in the pool.143 Each
of the insureds substitutes a small certain cost—the premium—
for the possibility of a larger uncertain loss.144 This is how risk is
spread. From an economic perspective, spreading risk is
socially desirable because it reduces uncertainty and frees up
capital for investment that might otherwise be retained as a
hedge against loss.145
Liability insurance, a type of insurance that covers
claims arising from legal liability,146 also spreads risk. But
because it makes payments to third parties—to those injured
by the insured—rather than the insured, liability insurance

value, which is the mean of the sums of the probability of loss multiplied by the
magnitude in each instance. Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification:
The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 843 (1986).
141 EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK
AND INSURANCE 163 (11th ed. 2014).
142 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540 (1987) (“The insurer’s aggregation function derives from
operation of the law of large numbers—the empirical phenomenon according to which
the probability density function of average loss tends to become concentrated around
the mean as the sample number increases. Applied to insurance, the law of large numbers
means that as one increases the number of insured persons possessing independent
and identically-valued risks, one increases the accuracy of prediction of expected loss
for each individual.” (footnote omitted)). There is no advantage to aggregating highly
correlated risks because those risks will not occur randomly and will push the
predicted average loss for a pool toward the total loss for the pool. See id. (“As long as
the risks of pool members are uncorrelated, that is, statistically independent, the
insurer can accumulate small premiums from each insured and still have funds
sufficient in any period to pay those losses that actually occur. In contrast, if risks were
highly correlated, there would be no advantage to aggregating them. Thus, losses from
nuclear war are uninsurable.” (footnote omitted)). For a detailed explanation of the law of
large numbers, see VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 141, at 36-40.
143 Of course, adjustments are made to premiums to reflect the riskiness of
each insured and reward the insured for risk-lowering activities. See infra Sections
II.C, II.D.
144 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 141, at 41.
145 See id. at 8.
146 See id. at 45.
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also benefits tort victims by providing compensation.147 But
liability insurance does much more than simply cover the
losses of tort defendants and compensate those they injure.
Liability insurance has a profound, but largely underappreciated,
additional role in the tort system. Liability insurance actually
drives the tort process. The availability of liability insurance
determines who is sued, the nature of the legal claims made,
the shape of settlement negotiations, and nearly all aspects of a
tort case. Indeed, liability insurance can even influence the
laws that establish a plaintiff’s liability.148 As Tom Baker and
Peter Siegelman have observed, “little or nothing in Tort law
makes sense except in the light of liability insurance.”149
Damages, the most important aspect of the case to a contingentfee tort lawyer, are inextricably intertwined with liability
insurance. Tort lawyers are unlikely to take cases where
damages are not collectable, making liability insurance a de
facto element of most tort claims.150 Moreover, since payments
made to satisfy tort claims rarely exceed policy limits, the
amount of available liability insurance also functions as a cap
on a defendant’s tort liability.151 As a result, liability insurance
is not just a vital component of the tort system; it is the driving
force behind the tort system.152
But the presence of insurance to cover a defendant’s
legal liabilities appears to create a conundrum. The tort system
deters tortious conduct by forcing injurers to internalize the
cost of the harm they cause. But if an injurer can simply transfer
her liability to an insurer by paying a small premium, the tort
system loses its ability to deter tortious conduct. In other
words, someone who cheerfully relies on liability insurance
147 See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 170 (noting that tort law is
“centrally concerned with problems of compensation for victims”); see also Gary T.
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 313, 328 (1990) (noting that liability insurance is not only consistent with the
compensatory-justice norm of tort law, but actually serves to further that norm, particularly
when a tort judgment exceeds the defendant’s assets, and ensures that the victim is more
fully compensated than he otherwise would have been in the absence of insurance).
148 See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That
Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005) [hereinafter
Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation].
149 See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 169.
150 See Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation, supra note 148, at 4-5.
151 Id. at 7 (“Even tort litigation against wealthy individuals and large
organizations has become, in all but the unusual case, an exercise in recovering money
from liability insurance companies and only from insurance companies.”).
152 See id. at 15 (analogizing the relationship of liability insurance to tort law
to an invisible force of nature); see also Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and
Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 166, 166-67
(2000) (noting that indeed, liability insurance funds “over 90 per cent of tort-related
payments in the United States”).
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when taking risks has no economic incentive to reduce their
risky behavior.153 This misalignment of incentives is a classic
moral hazard problem. As it turns out, however, insurance is,
in many instances (apart from foodborne safety), quite capable
of managing moral hazard and controlling risky conduct.
B.

Insurance and the Problem of Moral Hazard

Few discussions of insurance get very far without at
least acknowledging the moral hazard problem. Put simply,
moral hazard describes the dampening effect of insurance on
someone’s motivations to reduce risk.154 Given the indemnification
and risk-shifting aspects of liability insurance, it is not surprising
that some might think that liability insurance would exacerbate
the food safety problem. Liability insurance could shield a food
supplier from the costs of its unsafe food practices, thereby
creating a disincentive for a supplier to take greater care and
thus increasing societal risk. This is indeed the view of leading
food safety researchers.155
Yet insurance is increasingly understood as much more
than a victim-compensation and risk-spreading device. Insurance
is also a way to mitigate risk through the use of information.156
Insurance does not inherently decrease the uncertainty of the
risk that individual insureds face or lessen the probability of
the financial loss associated with risk.157 Insurers can, however,
use data and sophisticated actuarial analyses to make
predictions about the nature of the risks faced by their insureds,
structure coverage, and formulate strategies to minimize moral
hazard. Information is the key to understanding insurance as a
tool for mitigating societal risk. Insurers use claims data,
supplemented by other information, to predict the cost of losses

153 See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 169 (“[L]iability insurance would
seem to sever the link between injurers’ behavior and its financial consequences, since
the party that caused the injury no longer ends up paying for it.”).
154 Id. at 169 n.3 (“[M]oral hazard is the tendency of insurance to diminish an
insured’s incentives to take care that would reduce the risk being insured against. It
arises because of a classic externality: the costs of taking care fall on the insured, but
the benefits of care accrue to the party who will pay for any losses, namely the
insurer.”). For the classic explanation of moral hazard, see Kenneth J. Arrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 941
(1963). For an in-depth survey of the history of moral hazard, see Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
155 See, e.g., BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (suggesting liability insurance
“distort[s] incentives for firms to produce safer food”).
156 Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK,
supra note 23, at 8 (referring to insurance as a risk-reducing technology).
157 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 141, at 40.
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that their individual insureds will experience. Once these
losses are controlled, overall risk is reduced.
But why would an insurer want to lower risk? To secure
a competitive advantage. If an insurer can lower its premiums
by lowering its risk of paying claims, it can underprice its
competitors, thereby attracting more business.158 Marketplace
considerations, rather than altruism, drive insurers to reduce
risk. Nevertheless, this arrangement can work to society’s
advantage. When an insurer’s competitive goals are sufficiently
aligned with society’s interests in risk reduction, insurance can
function as a socially beneficial safety regulator.159 This is the
insurance equivalent of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.”160
Insurers engage in the business of spreading risk for their own
gain, but their actions can give rise to a collective social benefit.
Now that it is clear why insurers are driven to reduce risks to
lower premiums, it is important to understand how insurers
lower risk and reduce moral hazard.
C.

Insurance and Risk Reduction

Insurers use many tools to reduce risk,161 and the
general consensus is that they work reasonably well.162 These
tools include financial incentives such as underwriting, a
process through which insurers screen and evaluate applicants
to determine the degree of risk they pose.163 Insurers can either
reject the applicant outright as too risky164 or agree to cover the
applicant and set the premiums based on the applicant’s level
of risk.165 Insurers also use experience rating, a pricing process
through which premiums are set based on the insured’s prior
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 201.
Id. at 202.
160 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 345 (George Routledge & Sons 1900) (suggesting that individuals who
pursue their own self-interest are led by an invisible hand to promote the public
interest even though it was never their original intention to do so).
161 These tools have been described in detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Baker &
Siegelman, supra note 25; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17; Tom Baker & Rick
Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional
Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412 (2013).
162 See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 169-70 (noting that “insurance
contracts contain numerous structural features designed to limit moral hazard, and the
consensus is that these features seem to work reasonably well”).
163 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION 7 (6th ed. 2015).
164 This also serves a gatekeeping function. See Tom Baker & Thomas O.
Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 294-95
(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2008).
165 See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 163, at 7.
158

159
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claims.166 Insureds with prior claims will incur higher
premiums than those without prior claims. Insurers can also
impose other financial incentives incorporated into the insurance
contract, such as coverage limits,167 deductibles,168 coinsurance,169
and coverage exclusions,170 which force the insured to share part
of the loss with the insurer (or, in the case of an exclusion, the
insured will bear the entire loss) as an incentive to prevent loss.171
In addition, insurers use other means of lowering risk. For
example, insurers often develop and promote their own safety
standards, compliance with which results in lower premiums and
sometimes is even required as a prerequisite for coverage.172
Insurers also educate their insureds about the risks they face so
that insureds can reduce the frequency or severity of claims.173
When put into context, it is easy to see how these riskreduction techniques lower societal risk. Homeowners insurance
provides a good example. Insurers analyze bulk homeowners’
claims data to develop information about the risks that generate
claims by homeowners, as well as the magnitude of those claims.
When this general risk information is paired with the information
provided by an insured in her application for insurance and the
insured’s claims history, an insurer can use financial tools, such
as risk-based premiums, to encourage the homeowner to reduce
her risks. For example, an insurer will raise premiums for
homeowners who have a pool, a trampoline, or any other
attractive nuisance on their property.174 The prospect of higher
premiums also discourages homeowners from having these in
See id.
A coverage limit is a cap on the total amount of the cover (e.g., $1,000,000)
that still may be less than the total potential liability exposure of the insured. Baker &
Swedloff, supra note 161, at 1420.
168 A deductible is a threshold amount that an insured must cover before
insurance will cover a claim (e.g., the first $5,000 of liability). Id.
169 Coinsurance is a percentage that an insured will be responsible for in
addition to any insurance cover (e.g., 20%). Id.
170 For example, insurers typically exclude coverage for losses resulting from
expected risks or intentional actions. See, e.g., Co-operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 45
A.3d 89, 94 (Vt. 2012) (“Where an insured’s tortious acts are intentional, a policy
exclusion for intentional acts by ‘an insured’ generally bars coverage for claims made
by any insured under the same policy.” (quoting N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d
151, 163 (Vt. 2001))). These contract provisions ensure that insureds bear the full cost
of certain risks within their control and encourage greater care with respect to those
risks. Baker & Swedloff, supra note 161, at 1420.
171 See id.; see also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 208-09 (noting that
while deductibles and copayments preserve an incentive by the insured to take care,
that incentive is weaker than risk-based premiums).
172 Id. at 211.
173 Id. at 210-11; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 161, at 1423.
174 See 8 Factors That Can Affect Your Homeowners Insurance Rates, WELLS
FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/financial-education/insurance-protection/eight-factorshomeowners-insurance-rates/ [http://perma.cc/WPG5-X6BU] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
166
167
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the first place. Homeowners who remove trampolines from
their yard benefit from a premium reduction, and the
homeowner’s neighbors benefit from the decrease in the risk of
an injury to their children who might use the trampoline and
injure themselves.
In theory, food safety liability insurance would work the
same way. Insurers would use tort claims data to assess which
risks generate losses and the size of those losses. Based on that
data, insurers could use risk-based premiums, coverage
exclusions, and other tools to control risk. For example, if a
particularly risky food item generates a high number of
foodborne-illness tort claims, an insurer could reduce the risks
associated with that food item by increasing the premiums (or
excluding coverage altogether) when restaurants serve that
food item. This would encourage restaurants to stop serving
that particular food item, which would benefit society by
lowering its overall risk of foodborne illness. Indeed, the more
modern, sophisticated understanding of the risk-reducing
potential of insurance appears to undercut the traditionally
expressed objection to liability insurance as a source of moral
hazard in the food safety context.175 Yet the distinctive nature
of foodborne illness significantly inhibits the regulatory powers
of liability insurance as a means to improve food safety.
D.

Liability Insurance as an Effective Private Risk
Regulator

While liability insurance has the capacity to function as
an effective risk regulator, there is no guarantee that it will
always do so.176 In order for liability insurance to effectively
regulate risk, certain conditions must be present. First, it is
axiomatic that insurers must be able to employ these riskmanagement techniques in order to function as risk regulators.
Insurance regulations that restrict or prohibit some of these
techniques blunt insurers’ ability to reduce moral hazard.177
Second, it is also necessary that insureds be risk averse and
175 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 199 (noting that insurance has
traditionally been viewed “as antithetical to risk reduction”). For an example of the
traditional view in the context of food safety, see BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
176 See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 139, at 1808-10, 1817-22 (finding
that insurers issuing directors’ and officers’ coverage do not monitor their insureds for
loss prevention, thereby decreasing incentives for the insureds to avoid losses and
increasing moral hazard).
177 Of course, other concerns such as fairness can come into play when insurers act
as private regulators unfettered by the constitutional and statutory limits imposed on
government regulators. See Abraham, Four Conceptions, supra note 24, at 683-93.
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have the capacity to control risk by exercising care. This means
that insureds must be able to take precautions to avert harm to
others.178 If insureds cannot control their own risk, imposing
these risk-reducing mechanisms on insureds simply will not
work. Third, insurers must have the ability to observe their
insureds’ level of care so that they can price and structure the
insurance contract to address each insured’s level of risk.179
Fourth, the insurer’s incentives must be sufficiently aligned
with those of society. Simply put, the insurer’s competitive
drive and quest for profits must steer its activities in a direction
that reduces societal risk.180 In other words, a liability insurer
that can profitably operate without monitoring its insureds’
behavior for risk will not be an effective risk regulator.181 Finally,
there must be sufficient tort liability. If victims fail to file tort
claims in sufficient numbers or if they consistently receive
inadequate damages awards, the tort system will underdeter
harm. Absent sufficient deterrence, liability insurance premiums
will be lower than they would be under full deterrence; premiums
will reflect the expected losses resulting from diminished tort
liability rather than the risk insureds actually pose to society.
Under such conditions, it may simply be cheaper for insureds to
purchase liability insurance and exercise less care than for
insureds to make reasonable efforts to reduce risk.182
Thus, the effectiveness of liability insurance as a risk
regulator depends heavily on context. In the context of foodborne
illness, the problem is partly informational, partly based on
cognitive biases of food suppliers,183 and partly related to
litigation difficulties. Consumers are beset with informational
disadvantages that limit their capacity to identify risky food
See Shavell, supra note 152, at 167.
See Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 127
(1982) (noting that if insurers cannot observe the prevention activities of individual
insureds, then insurers cannot link premium levels and contract terms to those
activities); Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 174 n.9 (“When insurers can observe
care and activity levels, there is no informational asymmetry, and the first-best
solution—to require the efficient level of care and provide full insurance—is achievable
by contract.”). Even in the absence of insurer observation, sufficiently high cost-sharing
levels could still provide insureds with an incentive, albeit a weakened incentive, to
take care. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25,at 13; see also Steven Shavell, On Moral
Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979) (noting that incomplete coverage
partially addresses the moral hazard problem).
180 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 202.
181 See generally Baker & Griffith, supra note 139 (finding that directors’ and
officers’ insurers do not monitor risk-reduction activities of their insureds, leading to
increased moral hazard).
182 See Jan M. Ambrose et al., The Economics of Liability Insurance, in
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 2D 320 (Georges Dionne ed., 2014); Patricia M. Danzon, Liability
and Liability Insurance for Medical Malpractice, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 309, 316 (1985).
183 See infra Section III.B.
178
179
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and hamper their ability to connect a foodborne illness to its
source. Food suppliers are subject to cognitive biases that lead
them to underestimate the risk they pose to consumers. These
problems, in turn, constrain the deterrence capability of the tort
system with respect to foodborne illnesses.
III.

FOOD SAFETY, RISK, AND THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION

Food safety is driven by the economics of information.184
In a hypothetical market where consumers have perfect
information, they will know and appreciate the perils associated
with food. In such a market, suppliers of unsafe food risk
reputation loss, reduced market share, loss of revenue, and
possible closure.185 In theory, the threat of these market
consequences would be sufficient to discipline rational food
suppliers and ensure a high level of safety in the food they
supply.186 Unfortunately, this is not how the real market for food
works. Food safety is a “credence” attribute of food.187 This means
that a consumer typically cannot judge whether a food item is safe
when it is purchased or even after the food item is consumed.188
This leads to moral hazard and adverse selection in the market
for food,189 both of which shift the risk of contaminated food
from suppliers to consumers. In addition, the market for safe
food is confounded by an additional factor. Food suppliers are
184 The economics of information is a form of microeconomic theory that
examines how information affects economic decisions. Important contributions to the
economic analysis of information problems in markets include George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); George A. Akerlof, The Market
for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 49091 (1970); Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information and
Individual Action, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 380 (1971); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk,
and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy, 6 BELL J. ECON. 552 (1975).
For an overview of the economics of information, see generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Contribution of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 1441 (2000).
185 See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for
Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 504-22 (1999) (using empirical data to
assess the impact of reputational penalties); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The
Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 653, 654 (2005) (“[A]llegations or charges that a firm violated environmental
regulations correspond to economically meaningful and statistically significant losses
in the firm’s share values.”).
186 See Alexander, supra note 185, at 495-96 (noting that a reputational
penalty resulting from unmet consumer expectations can increase the supplier’s cost of
providing a low quality product); Diana Crumley, Achieving Optimal Deterrence in
Food Safety Regulation, 31 REV. LITIG. 353, 372 (2012) (noting that the reputational
penalty functions like a government-imposed sanction).
187 See infra Section III.A.1.
188 See infra Section III.A.1.
189 See infra Section III.A.4.
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subject to cognitive biases that lead them to underestimate the
risk they pose to consumers.190
A.

Information and Safe Food
1. Food Safety and Credence Attributes

All goods and services, from used cars to clothes to
professional services to food, possess a range of qualitative
attributes that reflect the level of information available about
those goods and services. Economists group these informational
attributes into three categories, labeled “search,” “experience,”
and “credence.”191 Search attributes can be directly observed by
a consumer prior to purchase.192 For example, a consumer can
look at, touch, and smell a cantaloupe to determine whether it
is ripe and ready for purchase. Ripeness, as a search attribute,
allows a consumer to assess the value of the cantaloupe and
determine the fairness of its price—with respect to that
attribute—prior to purchase.193
A product’s experience attributes can only be known by
experiencing the product, which invariably occurs only after
purchase and use. A consumer cannot tell how a cantaloupe
actually tastes just by looking at it or smelling it. While she can
tell whether it is ripe, she cannot know if it is sweet or bland.
Thus, she cannot assess its value to her—based on taste—until
purchase and consumption.194
For products that predominately feature search and
experience attributes, consumers usually have enough information
to drive market forces to ensure high quality. In the case of search
attributes, consumers can immediately recognize a lower quality
product. The likely result would be a decrease in sales of that
product. In the case of a product with experience attributes,
suppliers have an incentive to maintain quality standards, but
only in cases of repeat purchases.195 Under such circumstances, a

See infra Section III.B.
See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal
Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1973); Phillip Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 315 (1970).
192 See Nelson, supra note 191, at 312.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 311-12.
195 See Akerlof, supra note 184, at 490-91. Repeat purchases of goods with
experience attributes can mitigate the information problem, but the efficacy of repeat
purchases to assure quality “requires two necessary conditions: 1) consumers must
learn the quality of the purchased item sufficiently quickly, and 2) they must renew
their purchases sufficiently often.” Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and
190
191
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decrease in quality can lead to a bad reputation, a reduction of
sales, and a decrease in revenues. The prospect of lower revenues
can create the incentive to produce a higher quality product. A
pair of socks, a pen, a laptop computer, a cell phone, and a
lawnmower are all examples of products in which search and
experience attributes dominate. Most everything a consumer
might want to know about these products can be determined
either before purchase or after use.
Credence attributes, however, are different from search
and experience attributes in one fundamental way. Credence
attributes are difficult or impossible for a consumer to evaluate
even after experiencing or using the product.196 Food safety is a
credence attribute of food for two reasons: (1) the information
asymmetry between the food suppliers and consumers and (2) the
enigmatic nature of foodborne illness. Thus, a consumer cannot
determine whether a food item is free from pathogenic
contamination prior to purchase and often cannot connect ensuing
illness back to a specific food item.
2. Information Asymmetry
When I was 16 years old, I worked as a short-order cook
in a family-style restaurant. One morning, when retrieving a
dozen eggs from the walk-in refrigerator, I dropped the eggs
just out of sight of the customers. Naturally, the eggs broke,
spreading yolks and whites across the dirty restaurant floor.
When I began to scoop the eggs up to discard them, a manager
stopped me. “Pick out the shells and use them for scrambled
eggs,” he said. I am embarrassed to say that I complied and
cooked the dirty eggs. Yet no customers ever complained. If the
eggs sickened anyone, they never told us. The restaurant saved
a couple of bucks by using the dirty eggs, and no one was the
wiser. This nauseating incident nicely illustrates the concept of
asymmetric information in the marketplace for food. The
manager and I had more information about the eggs than our
customers. We knew the eggs had been dropped on the filthy
floor. In the absence of complete information, the customers
happily consumed their dirty scrambled eggs and then paid
their check.
Informational asymmetry is a fundamental characteristic
of the market for food. Consumers simply have less information
Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2007)
(citing JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 112 (1988)).
196 See Darby & Karni, supra note 191, at 68-69 (“Credence qualities are those
which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.”).
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about the safety of the food they buy than the suppliers who
put that food on the market.197 As illustrated by the example of
the dirty scrambled eggs, this problem is particularly acute
with respect to food. Any time food is grown, touched, processed,
prepared, or otherwise handled for us by someone out of our
sight, there will be informational asymmetry. While this may
not be a significant problem when the person handling our food
is familiar and trustworthy (i.e., a family member or friend),
our modern food system exacerbates the asymmetric
information problem.
Our food supply chain has become increasingly complex.
The declining number of family farms,198 the increasing number
of industrial farms,199 and the increasing interconnectedness of
the global food system all tend to promote the use of highly
complicated supply lines that are difficult to trace.200 Add to this
mix a significant increase in the consumption of meals prepared
outside of the home,201 and the result is a substantial information
disconnect between consumers and the food they consume.
Consumers often do not know who supplied their food (other
than the entity at the end of the food chain, such as a restaurant
or supermarket), how their food was handled (whether it was
properly stored or refrigerated, whether it was exposed to
rodents, insects, or other vermin), or even what ingredients
have been added to it. This puts consumers at a significant
disadvantage with respect to judging the quality of food.202
On the other hand, suppliers have significantly more
knowledge about the food product they are selling. While a
supplier might not know for sure if its food products are
197 S. Andrew Starbird, Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety, 87
AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 15, 15 (2005).
198 Roberto A. Ferdman, The Decline of the Small American Family Farm in
One Chart, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
blog/wp/2014/09/16/the-decline-of-the-small-american-family-farm-in-one-chart/ [http://
perma.cc/22J7-NAMM] (noting that the number of farms in the country has fallen by
roughly four million since 1935).
199 Factory Farms Continue to Dominate U.S. Livestock Industry, FOOD & WATER
WATCH (May 27, 2015), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/pressreleases/factory-farmscontinue-to-dominate-u-s-livestock-industry/ [http://perma.cc/KXB5-JD8Q] (detailing growth
of industrial farms).
200 Susan A. Schneider, Notes on Food Law: An Overview of the Food Safety
Modernization Act, 2011 ARK. L. NOTES 39, 44 (2011).
201 Ashley Arthur, Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National
Standard to Replace the Growing Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 305, 308 (2010) (noting that “Americans are [now] eating out at a rate
twice that in the 1970s”).
202 John M. Antle, Efficient Food Safety Regulation in the Food Manufacturing
Sector, 78 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1242, 1243 (1996) (“When information about product
quality before purchase is imperfect, consumers are put in the position of buying a
product whose quality is uncertain.”).
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contaminated with E. coli, the supplier will know, for example,
what it did (or did not do) with the food (e.g., how the food was
handled, who handled the food, what was added to the food, how
the food was packaged, how the food was stored, or whether it
was properly tested).203 But the information imbalance between
supplier and consumer is not the only information problem. The
consequences of this informational asymmetry are amplified by the
special informational difficulties associated with foodborne illness.
3. The Enigmatic Nature of Foodborne Illness
There are more than 250 different identifiable enteric
foodborne diseases, most of which are caused by a variety of
bacteria, viruses, and parasites.204 Since each of these diseases
has different symptoms, there is not one set of readily identifiable
indicators of foodborne illness.205 In addition, different foodborne
illnesses have drastically different incubation periods. For some,
symptoms can develop as quickly as one hour after consumption
of contaminated food, as with a Staph infection.206 Campylobacter
203 For example, in 2008 and 2009, the Peanut Corporation of America
shipped peanut butter contaminated with Salmonella Typhimurium. The results were
devastating. Over 700 people were known to have been sickened, with a quarter of
them hospitalized. Nine people died. See Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella
Typhimurium Infections Linked to Peanut Butter, 2008-2009 (FINAL UPDATE), CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 11, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/
2009/peanut-butter-2008-2009.html [http://perma.cc/Y2PC-9NZ7]. The company did not
know for sure that its peanut butter was contaminated, but it did ship peanut butter
before receiving test results for Salmonella. When told that peanut butter shipments
would be delayed because Salmonella test results were not yet available, Stewart
Parnell, the company’s president, wrote in an email, “Shit, just ship it. I cannot afford
to loose (sic) another customer.” Maryn McKenna, “Sh*t, Just Ship It”: Felony
Prosecution for Salmonella-Peanut Executives, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2013, 12:30 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2013/02/prosecution-pca/ [http://perma.cc/PY9N-UVBH].
204 Foodborne
Germs and Illnesses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html
[http://perma.cc/JS8K-ESDX]. While more than 250 pathogens and toxins are known to
cause foodborne illness, see Foodborne Illness and Outbreak, supra note 53, the
overwhelming majority of known foodborne illnesses (about 91%) in the United States
are caused by five pathogens: Salmonella, Norovirus, Clostridium perfringens,
Campylobacter, and Staphylococcus aureus. Estimates of Foodborne Illness, supra note
2; see also CDC 2011 Estimates: Findings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.html
[http://perma.cc/
5MJA-Q9H8] (last updated Jan. 8, 2014); MICHAEL B. BATZ ET AL., UNIV. OF FLA.
EMERGING PATHOGENS INST., RANKING THE RISKS: THE 10 PATHOGEN FOOD-COMBINATIONS
WITH THE GREATEST BURDEN ON PUBLIC HEALTH 7-8 (2011), http://www.rwjf.org/
content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2011/rwjf70101 [http://perma.cc/TU3S-DE9S].
205 Foodborne Germs and Illnesses, supra note 204. In the case of foodborne
illness, though, the microbe or toxin enters the body through the gastrointestinal tract.
Id. Thus, first symptoms often appear in the gastrointestinal tract, causing nausea,
vomiting, abdominal cramps, and diarrhea. Id.
206 See Understanding Food Poisoning—Symptoms, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.
com/food-recipes/food-poisoning/understanding-food-poisoning-symptoms [http://perma.
cc/SFU2-KUBD] (last visited July 8, 2016).
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can take up to 10 days to show symptoms, but it can also show
symptoms in a few days.207 A parasitic infection, such as Giardia,
can take weeks to show symptoms.208
The often significant delay in the onset of symptoms
makes it very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to connect
the infection with a food source.209 Moreover, the evidence that
can definitively connect a food item to an illness—the leftovers (if
any)—are often long gone by the time symptoms appear. Finally,
many microbes associated with foodborne illnesses are also
spread through nonfood means. For example, E. coli is commonly
spread through food, drinking water, swimming water, and
through toddler-to-toddler contact at day care centers.210 Thus,
it may be impossible to know for sure that a particular E. coli
infection is a foodborne disease.211
While asymmetric information and the special information
problems associated with foodborne illnesses are themselves
troubling, these problems lead to two additional difficulties in the
safe-food market: moral hazard and adverse selection.212 Both
lower economic incentives to produce safe food.

See id.
See Giardiasis—Topic Overview, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/digestivedisorders/tc/giardiasis-topic-overview [http://perma.cc/7GKC-WMGH] (last visited Apr.
7, 2016) (noting that Giardia “usually takes 7 to 10 days for the infection to develop,
but it can take from 3 to 25 days or longer”).
209 Overview of Attribution of Foodborne Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/attribution/overview.html [http://
perma.cc/36EC-52T6] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (“For the vast majority of foodborne
illnesses, we do not know what food is responsible for someone getting sick.”). The
sources of enteric foodborne illness, typically bacteria and viruses, cannot be detected
unless a food product shows visible signs of deterioration. Also, since symptoms of
foodborne illness can be as commonplace as diarrhea or as life threatening as organ
failure, Be Food Safe: Protect Yourself from Food Poisoning, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/befoodsafe/ [http://perma.cc/
F8YF-A7K3] (last visited July 8, 2016), and can vary dramatically in terms of how soon
symptoms begin after eating or drinking the contaminated food, the length of illness,
and when and how well a person recovers, Diseases & Topics: Food Poisoning & FoodBorne Illnesses, N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://epi.publichealth.nc.gov/
cd/diseases/food.html [http://perma.cc/B7PR-UBNL] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016), it may
be difficult to know with any degree of certainty that one is even suffering from a
foodborne illness.
210 Foodborne Germs and Illnesses, supra note 204.
211 See, e.g., Emily Sinovic, Family Questions Goat as Source of E. coli in Girl’s
Death, KATU NEWS (Oct. 15, 2014), www.katu.com/news/local/Family-questions-goat-as
-source-of-e-coli-in-serena-profitts-death-279382002.html [http://perma.cc/HX32-FTQ8]
(citing state public health officials as saying “that it is often hard to know with 100
percent accuracy the source of E. coli”).
212 Indeed, the market for insurance is also plagued by moral hazard and adverse
selection problems. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 163, at 6-7.
207
208
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4. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Moral hazard occurs when one party is more likely to
take risks because the costs of those risks will be borne, in
whole or in part, by another party. Although often discussed in
the context of insurance, moral hazard is not simply an
insurance concept.213 Moral hazard affects food safety because
food has credence attributes. When a consumer cannot link a
foodborne illness to a particular food product (or when a
consumer may not even discover she has a foodborne illness),214
an incentive exists for a food supplier to shirk on food safety.
This is especially true when adhering to safe food practices is
costly and the costs of the unsafe food will not (or are unlikely
to) be borne by the supplier. For example, when a restaurant
supplier ships meat that has fallen on the floor,215 a supermarket
grinds rotten pork and uses it for sausage,216 a meat processor
sells condemned and diseased cow carcasses,217 a peanut
processor ships peanut butter without proper testing,218 or a
sick restaurant worker reports to work and handles food,219 the
food supplier (1) has more information about the safety of the
food than consumers and (2) shifts the risk of the food (i.e., that
it will cause a foodborne illness) to consumers. This is the
essence of moral hazard. The results are negative externalities—
indirect costs borne by the consumer (and others) not represented
by the market price of the unsafe food. Since a food supplier is
See supra Section II.B; see Baker, supra note 154.
See Foodborne Illness: What Consumers Need to Know, http://www.fsis.
usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheet
s/foodborne-illness-and-disease/foodborne-illness-what-consumers-need-to-know/ct_ind
ex [http://perma.cc/2254-ZTWP] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (noting that foodborne illness
often presents flu-like symptoms, preventing many people from recognizing that their
illness is caused by pathogens in food).
215 See Adam Jourdan & Lisa Baertlein, Yum, McDonald’s Apologize as New
China Food Scandal Hits, REUTERS (July 21, 2014, 5:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/07/21/us-yum-brands-food-safety-idUSKBN0FQ01P20140721 [http://perma.cc/5
EAT-9EB8] (describing a TV report that showed workers at meat supplier picking up and
using meat from a factory floor).
216 See Tracy Dreispul, Circumventing Sullivan: An Argument Against
Awarding Punitive Damages for Newsgathering Torts, 103 DICK. L. REV. 59, 60 (1998)
(describing unsafe food practices by a supermarket chain).
217 See Laura Ly, Slaughterhouse Staff Indicted over Meat from Cows with Cancer,
CNN (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/california-bad-meatcharges/index.html?hpt=hp_t2 [http://perma.cc/NB6S-269Y].
218 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., C.A. Pinkham, Your Waiters Are Violently Sick While Serving You
Food, KITCHENETTE (July 23, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://kitchenette.jezebel.com/yourwaiters-are-violently-sick-while-serving-you-food-1609379121 [http://perma.cc/99WKKLVD] (providing examples of food workers going to work while ill); see also Victor,
supra note 122 (foodborne illness outbreaks that sickened hundreds of restaurant
customers linked to sick restaurant employees).
213

214
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motivated at least in part by profits, and since safe food is more
costly to produce, suppliers have a diminished incentive to
produce safe food.220 Thus, moral hazard contributes to the food
safety problem.
The resulting negative externalities associated with food
safety mean two things. First, there will be excessive levels of
unsafe food because the true cost of the food will not be reflected
in its market price, and second, expenditures by suppliers to
make food safe will be too low.221 The socially efficient level of
safe-food production will therefore be lower than what would
result in a market not plagued by negative externalities.222 This is
a classic market failure.223 But even if a food supplier is driven by
ethical standards to keep her food as safe as possible, there is
another, perhaps more powerful economic factor creating pressure
to shirk on food safety measures: adverse selection.
Adverse selection is the second problem resulting from
the information gap that occurs in the context of food safety.
When consumers cannot observe a supplier’s safety investments,
and therefore cannot make a judgment about the riskiness of
its products, consumers will only have information about average
rather than brand-specific risk levels for these goods. Economist
George Akerlof described this scenario as a “market for lemons.”224
And although Akerlof had low-quality automobiles in mind,
rather than food products, his analysis carriers over into the
market for food safety.
In a market for lemons, asymmetric information about
product quality can lead to market failure—a “race to the bottom”
in terms of quality. When consumers cannot distinguish between
the sellers of high-quality and low-quality goods, consumers
220 It is important to note that there is also a moral dimension to the moral
hazard problem. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). Arrow notes the moral dimension to
moral hazard in his reply to Professor Pauly’s comment on Arrow’s article. His point is
simple: people do not always respond to the external incentive provided by a subsidized
price in an economically rational manner. Instead, internalized moral principles also
drive individual behavior. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968). Thus, some food suppliers will strive
to produce safe food regardless of the cost. However, as noted in Section III.A.4, infra,
those who supply costly, safe food will face market pressures to shirk on safety. For an
in-depth survey of the history of moral hazard, including its moral dimensions, see
generally Baker, supra note 154.
221 Spencer Henson & Bruce Traill, The Demand for Food Safety: Market
Imperfections and the Role of Government, 18 FOOD POL’Y 152, 157 (1993).
222 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 215-17 (1986)
(noting that markets affected by negative externalities result in excessive production of the
harmful commodity and insufficient expenditures to control the negative externality).
223 See id. at 80-81 (listing externalities as among conditions that constitute
market failure).
224 See Akerlof, supra note 184, at 490-91.
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discount all quality claims, assume an average quality, and are
willing to pay only the price for goods of average quality. That
is, they will unwittingly select adversely against producers of
higher quality products. Sellers who offer goods at a level of
quality exceeding the average, and that reflect a price
exceeding the average, will thus be driven out of the market.
Further, low prices may discourage potential sellers who
want to offer a quality product from entering that market in
the first place. The result is market failure: a market
comprised of products of a lower quality than would occur
with symmetric information.225
In the context of food safety, Akerlof’s concept of a
market for lemons can be illustrated by a simple example.
Assume that suppliers of cantaloupes have better information
about the safety of the cantaloupes than consumers, and
further assume that those suppliers can be sorted into three
categories: (1) cantaloupe suppliers that implement costly food
safety practices and supply safe cantaloupes (for example, with
a very low risk of Listeria226) at the highest price (safest
category); (2) cantaloupe suppliers that implement less costly
food safety practices and supply less safe cantaloupes (for
example, with a moderate risk of Listeria) at an average price
(average category); and (3) cantaloupe suppliers that
implement no food safety practices and supply unsafe
cantaloupes (for example, with a high risk of Listeria) at the
lowest price (unsafe category). Since the category of any
particular supplier (safest, average, or unsafe) cannot be
determined by a consumer ex ante because a particular supplier’s
safety practices cannot be observed and consumers cannot test
for Listeria prior to purchase, buyers will only pay for cantaloupes
at a price that reflects the average safety offered from all
suppliers of cantaloupes. Moreover, because the safest cantaloupes
are costlier to produce than average or unsafe cantaloupes, the
average market price will be too low to support the suppliers of
Id. But see Katz, supra note 195, at 15 (citing JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
ORGANIZATION 109 (1988)) (noting that in real life, markets typically do
not disappear completely, but instead may simply “shrink as the frequency of
transactions decreases in comparison to what would occur if the available information
were perfect or if ‘anti-lemon devices,’ mechanisms to credibly assure the quality of
products, were available”).
226 A 2011 outbreak of Listeria associated with cantaloupes infected 147 people
and killed 33. See Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole Cantaloupes from
Jensen Farms, Colorado, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 27, 2012)
[hereinafter Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis], http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/
cantaloupes-jensen-farms/082712/index.html [https://perma.cc/C2UE-NT9C]. The outbreak
was linked to poor sanitation practices and inappropriate safety measures at the farm
where the cantaloupes were grown. See id.
225
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the safest cantaloupes. These suppliers will be forced to either
exit the market or cut back on safety. In essence, bad cantaloupes
drive good cantaloupes out of the market.227
B.

Cognitive Biases

The information problems associated with safe food and
the resulting moral hazard and adverse selection explain only
part of the reason why food safety risk is a particularly difficult
problem. Behavioral economics add another layer of complication:
food suppliers may underestimate the risk created by the food
they provide. Cognitive biases affect the way in which decisionmakers process information about risks. As a result, scholars
have increasingly focused on cognitive biases and how those
biases result in poor decisionmaking by individuals. Much of
this work, however, contains an implicit assumption: business
actors are rational, profit-maximizing entities, sometimes even
exploiting the behavioral biases of consumers.228 Thus, behavioral
economics has largely focused on how cognitive biases affect
consumer decisionmaking.229 The cognitive biases of food suppliers
have not received substantial attention from academics or
regulators and have only recently been addressed in the
behavioral economics literature.230 Cognitive biases are
nonetheless an important part of the food safety problem since
cognitive biases could cause food suppliers to underestimate the
risk of their food handling practices. One cognitive bias that is
especially relevant to food safety—though certainly not the only
one—is optimism bias.
Optimism bias causes individuals to underestimate the
likelihood of risk and overestimate their ability to control risk.231
227 These are characteristics similar to those described by Gresham’s Law: the
bad drives out the good. See Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Gresham’s Law or
Gresham’s Fallacy?, 94 J. POL. ECON. 185, 185 (1986). Although Gresham’s Law applies
more specifically to exchange rates, an analogy to food can be made. See Antle, supra
note 202, at 1244 (applying Gresham’s Law to the market for safe food).
228 Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to
Firms: A Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 4 (2010).
229 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210,
210-11 (2014); Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008) (arguing for increased regulation in credit card markets).
230 See, e.g., Diogo Thimoteo da Cunha et al., The Existence of Optimistic Bias
About Foodborne Disease by Food Handlers and Its Association with Training
Participation and Food Safety Performance, 75 FOOD RES. INT’L 27 (2015); Diogo
Thimoteo da Cunha et al., He Is Worse Than I Am: The Positive Outlook of Food
Handlers About Foodborne Disease, 35 FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 95 (2014)
[hereinafter He Is Worse Than I Am].
231 See T. SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY
POSITIVE BRAIN xv (2011) (defining optimism bias as “the inclination to overestimate
the likelihood of encountering positive events in the future and to underestimate the
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Two aspects of optimism bias are particularly relevant to food
safety. First, people generally believe that they are less likely
than most other people to experience adverse events, such as
health problems, accidents, and personal tragedy.232 Second,
people have a tendency toward a self-serving bias. In other
words, they tend to construe ambiguous information in an
advantageous and self-serving way. This leads to overconfidence
in their predictions.233 Thus, people overwhelmingly think that
they are smarter, more ethical, more productive, and even less
susceptible to optimism biases than other people.234 Self-serving
bias can even result in feelings of invulnerability.235
Researchers have evaluated optimism bias in the
context of food safety practices in the home.236 For example,
people generally believe that their risk of food poisoning is less
than that of the average person, that they are in control of
microbial food hazards when they prepare food themselves,237
and that food prepared by others is much more hazardous.238
And unsurprisingly, there is emerging evidence that
commercial food handlers suffer the same bias: they believe
they are less likely than their peers to spread a foodborne
disease to consumers.239 This can lead food handlers to abandon

likelihood of experiencing negative events”); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors
(and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139 (1997) (citing MAX H.
BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39 (3d ed. 1994))
(describing corporations’ inflated sense of their ability to control risks); Neil D.
Weinstein, Reducing Unrealistic Optimism About Illness Susceptibility, 2 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 11, 11-12 (1983); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of
Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132, 132
(1995); David M. DeJoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 335-37 (1989).
232 Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent OverOptimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 733, 737, 744 (2009); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through
Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 204 (2006). As a result of selective interpretation of
information, people systematically underestimate both their relative level of risk and
their absolute level of risk. Jolls & Sunstein, supra, at 204-05.
233 Williams, supra note 232, at 742.
234 Id. at 742-45.
235 See Frank P. McKenna, It Won’t Happen to Me: Unrealistic Optimism or
Illusion of Control?, 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 39, 43-44 (1993).
236 See, e.g., Susan Miles & Victoria Scaife, Optimistic Bias and Food, 16
NUTRITION RES. REVS. 3, 3 (2003).
237 Susan Miles et al., Public Perceptions About Microbiological Hazards in
Food, 101 BRIT. FOOD J. 744 (1999).
238 See Lynn J. Frewer et al., The Interrelationship Between Perceived
Knowledge, Control and Risk Associated with a Range of Food-Related Hazards
Targeted at the Individual, Other People and Society, 14 J. FOOD SAFETY 19 (1994).
239 He Is Worse Than I Am, supra note 230.
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protective attitudes and practices related to food safety, thereby
increasing the risk of foodborne illnesses among consumers.240
The difficulty with optimism bias is that while it is widely
recognized, it is very hard to counteract.241 For example, simply
providing education and training related to risks is unlikely to
work, because highlighting risk factors may not alter an
individual’s optimistic perception of that risk.242 Indeed, providing
information about risk can sometimes have the opposite effect—it
can make matters worse by increasing an individual’s optimism
bias.243 As a result, people with optimism bias are less likely to be
responsive to education.244 The implications for food safety are
quite unsettling: food safety training efforts may not make food
suppliers any less susceptible to optimism bias and could even
result in less safe food.
IV.

FOOD SAFETY, TORT LIABILITY, AND MONITORING RISK

Given that food safety is a credence attribute of food,
foodborne illnesses are extremely difficult to connect to a
source, and food suppliers are subject to cognitive biases that
alter their perception of risk, it should come as no surprise that
litigation rates for foodborne illnesses are low, resulting in an
underdeterrence problem. What is surprising, however, is the
severity of this underdeterrence problem. Food suppliers who
injure their customers are rarely brought to account for the
harm they cause.
Id.
See Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Beyond Liability: Correcting Optimism
Bias Through Tort Law, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 47, 65 (2009) (noting that “evidence suggests that
debiasing strategies that use risk education and information are costly and only partially
effective”); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 657 (1999) (noting that “optimistic
bias is an indiscriminate and indefatigable cognitive feature”); Weinstein & Klein, supra
note 231, at 138 (presenting four empirical studies on the viability of debiasing optimism
bias and finding weak and inconsistent effects).
242 Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY R941, R943 (2011)
(noting that “optimism bias is maintained in the face of disconfirming evidence” about
health risks); Patrick Carroll et al., Forsaking Optimism, 10 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 56, 59
(2006) (“People are less likely to forsake optimism when they perceive that they can
control either the outcome or its consequences.”); Weinstein & Klein, supra note 231.
243 Miles & Scaife, supra note 236, at 16 (“Merely pointing out risk factors can
provide new opportunities for biased interpretation and increases in optimistic bias.”).
244 Elizabeth C. Redmond & Christopher J. Griffith, Consumer Perceptions of
Food Safety Risk, Control and Responsibility, 43 APPETITE 309, 312 (2004). But see
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 232, at 209-11, 230 (suggesting that successful debiasing
strategies in response to optimism bias should take other more complex forms, such as
using an availability heuristic to increase an individual’s estimates of risk). In the food
safety context, this might be accomplished by exposing the individual to a specific
instance of risk, or by framing risk-reducing precautions in terms of losses rather than
gains. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 232, at 209-11, 230.
240
241
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Foodborne Illness and Underdeterrence
1. Low Litigation Rates

There are no national figures available that neatly set
out the litigation rate for tort claims arising from foodborne
illnesses, but all the available evidence leads to the same
conclusion: the litigation rate is extremely low. In the first and
only rigorous study of its kind, Jean Buzby and Paul Frenzen,
USDA researchers, estimated that the litigation rate for all
foodborne illness cases could be as high as 1 claim brought per
every 220,000 cases of foodborne illness or as low as 1 claim
brought per every 1.1 million cases of foodborne illness.245 Since
the data used for their study did not include confidential
settlement information, Buzby and Frenzen’s figures likely
underestimate the actual litigation rate. But even if the actual
litigation rate is much higher than estimated by Buzby and
Frenzen—even 1,000 times higher246—the litigation rate is still
245 Jean C. Buzby & Paul D. Frenzen, Food Safety and Product Liability, 24
FOOD POL’Y 637, 647 (1999). The range of the estimated number of lawsuits per
100,000 cases of foodborne illness is 0.09 to 0.45. Id. at 642. This is a litigation rate of
.00009% to .00045%, or 1 case brought per every 220,000 to 1,100,000 cases of
foodborne illness. While empirical studies of food safety litigation are rare, there is,
however, one study that appears to contradict Buzby and Frenzen’s finding on the
impact of food safety litigation. In a 2008 study, Maria Loureiro concluded that states
employing strict liability regimes that allow punitive damages enjoy fewer foodborne
illness incidents than states with strict liability regimes that do not allow punitive
damages. See Loureiro, supra note 115, at 210-11. The conclusions of the study,
however, are tempered by significant data limitations. First, the study excluded all
incidents in which a foodborne illness could not be linked to a food product. Id. at 205,
206. Since most foodborne illnesses are never linked to a source, most foodborne
illnesses were excluded from the study. Second, Loureiro’s data does not identify the
point along the food chain where the food safety lapses occurred. Id. at 206. Given that
much of our food travels across state lines and that out-of-state food suppliers are
subject to the same risk of litigation as in-state suppliers, it is unclear where (i.e., in
which states) the deterrent effects of the punitive damages laws would be felt.
Although Loureiro acknowledges these data limitations, she proceeds on the
assumption that such limitations do “not introduce any systematic significant bias,”
although she concedes that she has no way to test this assumption. Id. at 205 & n.2.
Perhaps the most significant problem with Loureiro’s study, however, is its lack of
litigation or punitive damages data. The study provides no evidence as to the frequency
or amount of punitive damages awards in any foodborne illness cases. Indeed, Loureiro
fails to identify even a single foodborne illness case in which punitive damages were
awarded. As a result, the study’s claimed link between punitive damages and improved
food safety is difficult to evaluate.
246 In other words, that there are 999 confidential settlements for every case
identified by Buzby and Frenzen is an overly generous and highly unlikely assumption.
Although the conventional wisdom is that 95% of cases settle, empirical evidence
suggests that the figure is lower for all cases, although only somewhat lower for tort
cases. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 122 (2009) (noting studies
that report settlement rates of about 70% to 80% in tort cases); see also id. at 130 tbl.3
(finding tort case settlement rates of 87.2% and 63.8% in two federal district courts
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incredibly low, less than half of one percent.247 But this is not
the only evidence of a very low litigation rate.
Even in circumstances involving the best-case litigation
scenario—an outbreak in which victims can be positively linked
to a foodborne pathogen and its source—evidence suggests that
few victims file suit. Buzby and Frenzen cite an example of food
poisoning cases involving V. vulnificus, a toxic marine bacterium
associated with the consumption of raw Gulf oysters.248 Between
1988 and 1997, there were an average of 22 foodborne cases of
V. vulnificus per year.249 These cases are fairly easy to trace.
The incubation period for V. vulnificus is about 18 hours, with
death following rapidly in about 50% of the cases, typically in
about two days after hospitalization.250 Since the oyster
industry is small and oysters bagged and shipped for sale are
tagged—identifying the harvester and harvest waters—victims
(or their surviving representatives) can trace the source of the
illness without too much difficulty. Yet in this best-case
scenario for foodborne illness litigation, Buzby and Frenzen
were only able to identify eight lawsuits and two confidential
settlements related to V. vulnificus over a 14-year period in
which there would have been over 300 cases.251
While the V. vulnificus example appears to suggest a
higher claiming rate than Buzby and Frenzen’s more general
estimates, these numbers are far from representative. First,
this kind of best-case litigation scenario is actually quite rare.
Most cases of foodborne illness—tens of millions each year—do
not involve outbreaks, involve longer incubation periods, are
not investigated by public health authorities, and are never
definitively linked to a source.252 But even in cases where
when excluding nonterminating cases). But even applying the conventional wisdom to
foodborne illness cases—that 95% of foodborne illness cases settle—and further assuming
that all of those settlements are confidential, there would only be 19 confidential
settlements for every 1 publicly reported case. The exaggerated assumption of 999
confidential settlements for every publicly reported foodborne illness case and the analysis
that follows this assumption brings the absurdly low litigation rate for foodborne illness into
sharp focus.
247 The upper range of Buzby and Frenzen’s estimate (.00045%) multiplied by
1000 would be .45%.
248 See Buzby & Frenzen, supra note 245, at 645-47.
249 Id. at 645-46.
250 Id. at 646.
251 Id. at 646-47.
252 Foodborne Illness and Outbreak, supra note 53; Steve Mills, Food
Poisoning: Source of E. coli Illness Often Can’t Be Found, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-11-18/news/0911170437_1_source-of-e-coli-foodborne-food-poisoning [http://perma.cc/7CRZ-MF5U] (describing near impossibility of
public health agencies identifying the source of suspected foodborne pathogens when
the victim is not part of an outbreak); Moss & Martin, supra note 136 (comparing the
frequency of having foodborne illness traced back to a particular supplier to a “meteor
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foodborne illnesses are part of an outbreak, it is still unlikely
that the foodborne illness will be connected with a source.
Many outbreaks are never investigated.253 And even when
investigated, nearly two-thirds of investigated outbreaks are
never fully solved.254 But what is particularly telling about this
V. vulnificus example is that so few of the grievously injured
victims brought suit. Half of V. vulnificus cases result in death.
Thus, there would have been roughly 150 deaths from V.
vulnificus during the 14-year period examined by Buzby and
Frenzen. Yet only 10 claims could be identified. But the dearth
of V. vulnificus cases appears to be far from an uncommon
scenario in the context of foodborne illness litigation. Other
examples seem to confirm that most victims in best-case
litigation scenarios do not file lawsuits.255
More recent data also supports Buzby and Frenzen’s
findings. Another food safety scholar, Alexia Brunet Marks,
investigating litigation trends in foodborne illness cases,
identified a total of 320 foodborne illness cases in an 11-year

strike”); see also Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United
States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 616 (1999) (noting that 81% of
foodborne illnesses are caused by unknown agents).
253 CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 91, at 1.
254 See id. (analyzing data from 10,409 foodborne disease outbreaks reported
to the CDC that occurred between 2002 and 2011 and finding that only 3,933—38%—
were fully solved).
255 For example, fewer than half of the victims appear to have filed suit in a
widely reported 2011 Listeria outbreak linked to cantaloupes that sickened 147 people,
33 of whom died. See Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis, supra note 226. Public health
officials definitively matched each of the 147 victims to the contaminated cantaloupe
and its supplier. Id. Yet only 66—fewer than half of the identified victims—appear to
have pressed legal claims against the supplier. See Karen Robinson-Jacobs, Victims of
Food-Borne Illness Don’t Usually Seek Legal Relief, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 24,
2015, 11:10 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/business-headlines/20150524victims-of-food-borne-illness-dont-usually-seek-legal-relief.ece [http://perma.cc/ACM5ZVVF] (citing a noted attorney who stated that he knows of only 66 victims who
pressed legal claims as a result of this outbreak). Despite the fact that 99% of the
known victims in this outbreak were hospitalized, Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis,
supra note 226 (suggesting that victims’ injuries were severe), an attorney familiar
with these cases reported that fewer than 50% of victims filed legal claims against the
known supplier of the cantaloupes. In another high-profile, widely publicized case, the
Peanut Corporation of America was responsible for an outbreak of Salmonella
Typhimurium linked to peanut butter in 46 states in 2008 and 2009. There were 714
confirmed victims of Salmonella Typhimurium linked to PCA’s peanut butter, with 9
confirmed deaths. See Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Infections
Linked to Peanut Butter, 2008-2009 (Final Update), supra note 203. Yet only 122 of the
known 714 victims (17%) filed suit against PCA and its insurer seeking compensation.
See Dan Flynn, Litigation Twist Removed, PCA Payments Ready, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/09/after-another-strange-twist-isremoved—pca-payments-okd/#.VoACGPH0nAI [http://perma.cc/H9ZG-AVLD] (noting
that only one of the 123 claims made against PCA was deemed suspicious and
disallowed).
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period, from 2000 to 2011.256 This works out to an average of
only 29 cases per year.257 Since confidential, out-of-court
settlements were not included in the Westlaw database used by
Marks, the number of cases in the database does not reflect the
total number of lawsuits filed.258 Even if we were to generously
assume (as we did above with the Buzby and Frenzen data)
that the actual litigation rate is higher than the number of
cases uncovered by Marks by a factor of 1,000 (that is, only 1
out of 1,000 lawsuits actually filed made it into the Westlaw
database, with the remaining 999 out of 1,000 lawsuits ending
in either a confidential settlement in favor of the plaintiff or a
dismissal), there still would only have been 320,000 cases filed
during that 11-year period. When this figure is compared to the
sheer number of foodborne illness cases during that same
period—over 528 million259—it becomes apparent that food
suppliers are not brought to account for the harm they cause.
Moreover, if victims injured by foodborne illness filed
suit at a similar rate as other non-motor-vehicle-related and
non-workplace-related injury victims, we should expect to see a
filing rate of about three percent.260 This would result in nearly
17.2 million lawsuits filed during that 11-year period, not the
mere 320,000 charitably assumed using Marks’s findings
multiplied by 1000.
While we cannot know for sure how many foodborne
illness claims are actually filed, the Buzby and Frenzen study,
the low level of claiming in the best-case scenarios outbreaks,
and Marks’s confirmatory findings strongly suggest that very
few victims of foodborne illness file tort claims.
2. Likely Reasons for Low Litigation Rates
There are many potential reasons for the low litigation
rate for foodborne illness. Causation problems likely play an
important role in suppressing foodborne illness claims: the
256 Professor Marks identified these cases using the Westlaw Combined Jury
Verdicts and Settlements database. Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Using Legal
Liability to Inform Food Safety Regulation, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 723, 761-62 (2013).
257 Id. This is similar to Buzby and Frenzen’s figure of 29.4 cases per year for
the period 1988–1997. Buzby & Frenzen, supra note 245, at 642.
258 Marks, supra note 256, at 763-64. Variations in state reporting mechanisms
may also account for the low number of cases in the database. Id. at 764.
259 Each year, 48 million persons contract a foodborne illness. See Estimates of
Foodborne Illness, supra note 2. Over an 11-year period, the total number of cases
would come to 528 million.
260 Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1099-102 (1996) (noting that empirical evidence suggests that claims are made by
about three percent of non-motor-vehicle-related and non-workplace-related injuries).
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victim cannot connect the foodborne illness with a particular
source, he or she suspects a particular food source but no longer
possesses the evidence (i.e., the food is gone and there are no
leftovers), no lab tests were conducted to confirm the presence of a
foodborne pathogen, or the victim simply cannot remember what
or where he or she ate.261 But there are other possible contributing
factors. Undoubtedly, some victims face the same impediments
that discourage victims in any tort lawsuit, including legal costs,
time constraints, and small damage amounts.262 Some victims do
not equate their “stomach virus” symptoms with a foodborne
illness.263 Others perhaps eschew litigation to protect their privacy
or to avoid embarrassment.264
But there is another reason that could explain why so
few claims are made: health insurance. Since health insurance
typically pays the bulk of the medical costs associated with a
foodborne illness, health insurance coverage reduces the
incentive to file a tort claim.265 And the expansion of health
insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act will only
intensify this effect.
B.

Underdeterrence of Food Safety Illnesses

Although there are many plausible explanations for the
extremely low litigation rate for foodborne illnesses, the
underclaiming by victims of foodborne illness has a profound
effect on the tort system by preventing it from adequately
deterring the risky behavior that leads to foodborne illnesses.
1. Underdeterrence and the Incentive to Take Care
Steven Shavell provides a short but elegant equation
that nicely illustrates the inadequate deterrence problem:

Marks, supra note 256, at 755.
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128, at 1453-59.
263 CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, ALL OVER THE MAP: A 10-YEAR REVIEW OF
STATE OUTBREAK REPORTING 5 (2011), http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/alloverthemap.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5W49-WP4R].
264 See, e.g., Robinson-Jacobs, supra note 255 (citing attorney Gary Newland,
speculating on why so few consumers bring tort cases based on a foodborne illness).
265 BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-10; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128, at
1462-63 (noting that health insurance coverage dilutes the compensation benefit of a
product liability claim). Although most health insurance policies have subrogation clauses
that allow the health insurer to collect from a tortfeasor or from a judgment to reimburse
the insurer for medical costs it covered, subrogation claims for foodborne illness costs are
almost never pursued by health insurers. BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 10-11. Insurers
likely forego subrogation claims for foodborne illnesses for many of the same reasons
victims do not pursue claims, including severe information impediments.
261
262
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If the probability p of sanctions is less than 1 and the magnitude of
the sanction is equal to the harm h, then the expected sanction ph
will be less than h, leading to too little deterrence.266

When applied to the case of foodborne illness, the
underdeterrence problem becomes apparent. If we use the
highly optimistic (and quite improbable) litigation rate of 1
claim brought per every 220 cases of foodborne illness—the
upper range of Buzby and Frenzen’s estimated litigation rate (1
claim brought per every 220,000 cases of foodborne illness),
generously multiplied by 1,000267—and further assume that all
filed foodborne illness cases are decided (or settled) in the
plaintiff’s favor, the probability of sanctions will be .0045 (1/220),
or .45%. If we use $1,626 as the harm per case of foodborne
illness, the average cost associated with the estimated 48 million
cases of foodborne illness per year,268 the underdeterrence
problem is evident. Shavell’s equation in the context of
foodborne illness litigation looks like this:
If the probability p of sanctions is .45% (.0045) and the magnitude of
the sanction, $1,626, is equal to the harm h, then the expected
sanction ph, is $7.32. Since ph is less than h, ($7.32 < $1,626) there
will be too little deterrence.

A tort system that provides inadequate deterrence has
significant consequences for safety. First, potential injurers
have a diminished incentive to take care to avoid harm to
others. As illustrated by the above example, the tort system forces
food suppliers to internalize only a fraction of the cost of the harm
they cause. As a result, these suppliers have less incentive to
invest in prevention. Second, underdeterrence causes actuarially
fair premiums269 for food safety liability insurance to be lower
than they would be under a full deterrence regime. Rather than
reflecting the risk of foodborne illness that insureds actually
pose to society, food safety liability premiums will only reflect
the cost of diminished tort liability. Under such conditions, it
may simply be less expensive for insureds to purchase liability
266 See Shavell, supra note 152, at 175. Shavell assumes that sanctions are not
raised to create adequate deterrence. Id. For a discussion of augmented damages as a
mechanism to promote adequate deterrence, see infra Section IV.C.
267 See supra Section IV.A.1.
268 See Scharff, supra note 5, at 123, 128. The figure of $1,626 is the average cost
associated with the estimated 48 million cases of foodborne illness per year and is based
on Scharff’s enhanced model that includes pain and suffering estimates. The figure is
derived from estimated costs for all cases of foodborne illnesses, ranging from mild to
severe. Id. at 124.
269 An actuarially fair premium equals the expected value of the payments,
with a minimum loading charge for administrative costs and residual risk. Wortham,
supra note 140, at 843, 856.
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insurance and exercise less care than to make reasonable efforts
to reduce risk270—a scenario that increases moral hazard and
worsens society’s risk of foodborne illness.271
2. Underdeterrence and the Difficulty of Observing and
Pricing Risk
Underdeterrence also inhibits insurers’ ability to
effectively observe and price risk. To function effectively as risk
regulators, liability insurers must be able to observe the risks
their insureds pose to third parties and assign premiums to
reflect those risks.272 The exceedingly low litigation rate for
foodborne illness may leave liability insurers with insufficient
data about the risk that food suppliers actually pose to the public.
In the absence of such data, liability insurers could have difficulty
distinguishing cost-effective food safety measures from costineffective (or even simply ineffective) measures. Such a lack of
data would make it difficult for insurers to provide insureds
effective financial incentives to reduce risk.273 But claims data
is not the only source of risk data.
Indicators of the risk posed by food suppliers might also
be found in the results of government enforcement actions
(such as restaurant inspection results or sanctions imposed by
government agencies) or private inspection reports. But such
information sources are unlikely to give sufficiently clear risk
data for the purposes of developing effective financial incentives
to reduce risk. Government enforcement is not particularly
robust,274 and the results of private inspections may not be
available to insurers and in any event may not be reliable.275
And the evidence on the relationship between restaurant-

See Ambrose, supra note 182; Danzon supra note 182, at 316.
In other words, food suppliers competing for consumers will keep their
prices low by making only those safety investments that are justified by cost. The tort
system does not force food suppliers to internalize the costs of the foodborne illnesses
they cause, and thus suppliers have a diminished incentive to invest in reasonable (and
costly) food safety precautions. Since liability insurance priced to reflect low tort
liability may be less expensive than taking safety precautions (because the insurance
protects the supplier against the actual risk he or she faces—a low risk of litigation), a
rational food supplier will simply choose cheaper insurance protection over more
expensive safety precautions.
272 See supra Section III.E.
273 While insurers can (and do) impose cost sharing, such as deductibles and
copayments, to provide insureds with an incentive to take care, cost sharing is a
comparatively weak incentive. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 161, at 1420; see also
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 208-09.
274 See supra Section I.B.3.
275 See supra Section I.C.
270

271
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inspection results and outbreaks of foodborne illness is at best
mixed, with some evidence suggesting there is no correlation.276
But there may be an even more fundamental pricing
problem related to the exceedingly low risk of tort liability for
foodborne illness. A low potential for tort liability translates into
low premiums, as there is little risk to spread. Thus, insureds and
insurers alike may lack meaningful incentives to lower the risks
associated with foodborne illnesses as a means to further
reduce already low premiums.
C.

Can Underdeterrence Be Corrected in Court?

Foodborne illness claims are not the only tort claims
that suffer from an underdeterrence problem. In response to
underdeterrence in a variety of circumstances, corrective
litigation techniques have been developed, including class actions
and industry-wide liability, and others, such as augmented
damage awards,277 have been proposed. Litigation mechanisms
such as class actions and industry-wide liability, including
enterprise liability and market share liability, will not, however,
make any difference in cases where there is a causation
problem,278 as in cases of foodborne illness where victims have
difficulty identifying the cause of their harm or connecting that
harm with a food product or a food supplier. Augmented
awards, on the other hand, hold some potential, at least in
theory, to address the underdeterrence problem in foodborne
illness litigation cases.279
Under the augmented awards approach, underdeterrence
could be remedied by allowing victims who do file and prevail at
trial to recover damages equal to the amount of the damages
that would have been awarded had all claims been filed.280 In
theory, this could produce efficient deterrence,281 particularly if
augmented damages awards were fully covered by liability
insurance and most or all food suppliers were covered by such
insurance. Because the liability awards under an augmented
awards approach would more closely reflect the social costs of
See supra Section I.B.4.
See infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
278 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in
Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691, 711 (2005) (“If individuals cannot prove their claims, how does
the class and aggregation of unprovable claims help?”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998).
279 Galligan, supra note 278, at 704-05; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 389-91 (2003); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive
Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1989).
280 Galligan, supra note 278, at 704-05.
281 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 278, at 887-96.
276
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unsafe food than the present system, the premiums charged by
insurers would also more closely reflect the true social costs of
unsafe food and would force food suppliers to internalize those
costs.282 This level of damages “makes conforming to the legal
standard cheaper than violating it.”283
One example of augmented damages awards, offered by
Robert Cooter, calculates total damages by multiplying the
harm to the plaintiff by the reciprocal of the enforcement
error.284 For example, if only 50% (or 1/2) of victims actually
bring suit and recover full compensatory damages, then only
50% of the social costs caused by injurers will be internalized.285
Under this scenario, the ratio of total damages to compensatory
damages paid by the injurer should equal 200% (or 2/1, the
reciprocal of 1/2). Cooter argues that this “rule of the
reciprocal” for enforcement error will increase damages to the
socially optimal amount.286
The downsides of this approach are significant. First, it
would result in a windfall to some victims, while resulting in no
award to the others who were also injured, thus offending
notions of justice.287 There is also the problem of imposing what
would be punitive damages on a defendant not because of his or
her willful or reckless behavior, but simply because other
victims did not file their lawsuits.288 But even if courts could
reasonably estimate and impose such augmented damages with
reasonable accuracy (a highly dubious assumption), this
approach would require all or nearly all food suppliers to carry
liability insurance with sufficiently high limits—perhaps in the
hundreds of millions of dollars—and would require the
development of a system for insurers to pool losses or share risks
so that no one insurer (and its pool of insureds) would bear a
disproportionate share of the liability. Such a scheme would
require national legislation, the calculation of a reasonably
282 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages:
Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS
487-89 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2013).
283 Cooter, supra note 279, at 1192.
284 Id. at 1148; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 278, at 889 (offering a
similar model).
285 That is, only 50% of the costs of the injuries will be borne by the injurers.
The remaining 50% would still be borne by consumers.
286 Cooter, supra note 279, at 1190. However, Cooter argues that these damages
should be applied to cases involving intentional acts, id., or “reckless disregard.” Robert D.
Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
73, 90-91 (1997).
287 Galligan, supra note 278, at 705. Of course, for the purposes of deterrence,
payments to the victim are irrelevant. Payments need not go to victims to achieve
deterrence. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 185.
288 Galligan, supra note 278, at 706.
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accurate underdeterrence rate, the coordination of damages
imposed by state and federal courts, and a host of other logistics.
All of these difficulties render the augmented-damages approach
an unlikely possibility.
V.

THE RISKS OF FOOD SAFETY LIABILITY INSURANCE:
MORAL HAZARD AND BEYOND

Although liability insurance can function effectively as a
private safety regulator in many situations,289 the case of food
safety liability insurance appears to provide a vivid
counterexample. Despite its shortcomings as an effective private
regulator of food safety, however, food safety liability insurance is
not wholly without benefits. Liability insurance provides
compensation to some victims of foodborne illnesses.290 It also
offers financial incentives—through the use of deductibles,
coinsurance, and policy caps—that can encourage food suppliers
to take greater care.291 And because tort liability is largely made
possible by liability insurance,292 some foodborne illness
lawsuits do proceed. These suits may have a salutary effect on
food safety. The bad publicity, damage to reputation, and loss
of customers a food supplier risks as the result of these
lawsuits are thought to provide some motivation to increase
safety efforts.293 The question that ought to be asked, however, is
not whether food safety liability insurance provides any benefits.
Rather, we should question whether those benefits outweigh the
potential harms posed by food safety liability insurance.
First, it ought to be noted that the benefits of food safety
liability insurance are not particularly robust. For example,
while some victims of foodborne illness do receive damages
awards,294 the overwhelming majority of people sickened by
food do not bring suit and receive no compensation from
liability insurance.295 These victims must shoulder the costs of
See supra Part II.
See supra Section III.A.
291 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 161, at 1420; see also Ben-Shahar & Logue,
supra note 17, at 208-09 (noting that while deductibles and copayments preserve an
incentive by the insured to take care, that incentive is weaker than risk-based premiums).
292 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
293 See, e.g., Lytton & McAllister, supra note 35, at 309 (quoting one food
industry lawyer, Brad Sullivan, who stated that “liability exposure is a major driver of
risk management among growers”); Marks, supra note 256, at 729 (arguing that lawsuits
provide “economic signal to firms to invest in food safety”).
294 See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 255 (noting that 122 victims of foodborne
illness linked to peanut butter received $12 million in liability insurance settlements
plus other “substantial” settlement payments).
295 See supra Section IV.A.1.
289

290
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foodborne illness, though often with assistance from health
insurance.296 And while insurance mechanisms like deductibles,
coinsurance, and policy caps—all forms of partial coverage—can
provide some incentive for food suppliers to take greater care,
those incentives are not nearly as effective as differentiated
premiums and only partially address moral hazard. As BenShahar and Logue note, “Deductibles and copayments give the
insured only a weakened incentive to take care because the
insured enjoys only part of the social benefit of making the
investment [in safety].”297 Finally, food suppliers already risk
substantial reputational damage, loss of customers, and financial
harm when they injure their customers in a significant and highly
visible manner,298 particularly in the case of a prominent
outbreak299—the scenario most likely to result in foodborne illness
litigation.300 It is not entirely clear that litigation will cause
further financial and reputational harm to a food supplier
beyond the harm caused by the initial publicity following an
outbreak. Thus, the additional threat of litigation on top of bad
publicity may not motivate a food supplier to make its food any
safer.301
Moreover, there are significant risks accompanying food
safety liability insurance, the most significant of which is an
increase in moral hazard. But this increased risk of moral hazard
has a different basis than the moral hazard concerns voiced by
296 Most victims of foodborne illness will likely be compensated, at least in part, by
health insurance (either private insurance or public health insurance, such as Medicare or
Medicaid), which will typically cover some or nearly all of a victim’s medical expenses. As of
2014, most Americans—90%—have some form of private or public health insurance.
See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ [http://perma.cc/CRC8-QK8N] (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016) (noting an uninsured rate of 10%).
297 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 17, at 209.
298 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128, at 1443-44 (noting that firms will
be motivated by market forces to enhance product safety out of fear that sales may
decrease if their products harm consumers).
299 See, e.g., Dan Flynn, Chipotle Outbreak Illness Count Hits 514 as CMG
Stock Dives Below $500, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews
.com/2015/12/chipotle-outbreak-illness-count-hits-514-as-cmg-stock-dives-below-500/#.
VuxDhRj1ZKo [http://perma.cc/56U9-BTDL] (noting that Chipotle Mexican Grill’s share
prices lost 5% of their value within 24 hours of the CDC’s announcement of an E. coli
outbreak associated with food served by the restaurant chain); Patrick Gillespie, Chipotle
Profits Tank After E. coli Scare, CNN MONEY (Feb. 2, 2016, 5:37 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2016/02/02/investing/chipotle-earnings-e-coli/ (reporting that Chipotle’s fourth quarter
profits were 44% lower in 2015 than in 2014 in the wake of the restaurant’s E. coli
outbreak); see Gillespie, supra (noting that Chipotle’s E. coli outbreak “crushed its ‘healthy
food’ image and scared away many customers across the country”).
300 See supra Section IV.A.
301 To be clear, however, most cases of foodborne illness will not result in
reputational harm since they are never connected to a food source or supplier. See
supra Section IV.A.1.
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food researchers such as Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco.302 Their
apprehensions about liability insurance were based on an
underestimation of the risk-reducing capacity of insurance. These
researchers, echoing traditional moral hazard concerns about
insurance, worried that liability insurance coverage would dilute
the deterrent effect of tort liability by transforming the costs of
unsafe food into a business expense (the premium).303 This, in
turn, would blunt a supplier’s incentives to make its food
safer.304 The current push for food safety liability insurance,305
however, has the potential to increase moral hazard for a
different reason: proponents of food safety liability insurance
overestimate the regulatory capacity of food safety liability
insurance. In other words, proponents of food safety liability
insurance believe it has the capacity to function effectively as a
private regulator of food safety.306 The nature of foodborne
illness, however, confounds the ability of liability insurance to
improve food safety. The considerable information asymmetries
between food suppliers and consumers307 and the enigmatic
nature of foodborne illness308 make it hard for consumers to
connect a foodborne illness to a particular food source. These
information problems also promote moral hazard and adverse
selection problems in the market for safe food.309 Moreover,
optimism bias, a particularly pernicious form of cognitive bias
(and one that is difficult to counteract), leads food suppliers to
underestimate the risk of their food handling practices.310 The
result is a food supply beset by safety problems and a tort
system that significantly underdeters foodborne illness.
Without adequate tort liability, food safety liability insurance
premiums will be relatively small—they will not reflect societal
costs of unsafe food but will instead reflect the few judgments
and settlements resulting from an extremely low litigation rate.
Premiums that do not reflect social risk but instead reflect an
exceedingly low risk of liability could have a perverse effect on a
food supplier’s incentive to take care. Food suppliers may find it
less expensive to purchase liability insurance and exercise less

302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310

See BUZBY ET AL., supra note 1.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
See supra Sections II.B-II.D.
See supra Section III.A.2.
See supra Section III.A.3.
See supra Section III.A.4.
See supra Section III.B.
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care than to take reasonable precautions to lower the risk of
foodborne illness—a moral hazard problem.311
But moral hazard is not the only potential risk that will
accompany greater use of food safety liability insurance.
Another such risk is the false signals that low food safety
liability insurance premiums will send about the risk society
faces from foodborne illnesses. Insurance premiums do more
than simply spread risk. Premiums also send strong signals about
the potential costs of a particular risk and provide insureds with
information that helps them discern the appropriate levels of
care they ought to take.312 High premiums suggest a greater
level of risk, while lower premiums indicate a lower risk.
Insurance prices that accurately reflect risk send signals that
can lead to decreased risk taking.313 Such concrete signals can be
particularly effective in cases where insureds’ decisionmaking is
subject to biases,314 as is the case with food safety.315 Given the
information problems and cognitive biases associated with food
safety, food suppliers have a hard time accurately predicting or
perceiving potential loss. Insurance premiums can only
generate proper incentives regarding risk when those
premiums accurately signal risk. To the extent that premiums
reflect underdeterrence by the tort system rather than the actual
risk of injury, insureds (and anyone else who is aware of the
premiums) receive inaccurate signals about the risk of injury.
At best, those inaccurate signals will be ignored. At worst, such
signals will lead to riskier behavior due to erroneous beliefs
about the real risks associated with foodborne illnesses.316
Another risk is the potential for food safety liability
insurance to dampen the demand for other types of insurance
products that may actually give insurers the ability to effectively
See supra Section IV.B.1.
See Susan K. Laury & Melayne Morgan McInnes, The Impact of Insurance
Prices on Decision Making Biases: An Experimental Analysis, 70 J. RISK & INS. 219, 220
(2003) (“If the relative prices of insurance contracts correctly reflect the relative
probability of loss, the price of each contract may be an important signal of the risk of
each choice or activity.”); Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 838 (2005) (“Insurance prices provide one of the
most obvious, and potentially meaningful, indications of the likelihood of an event and
the size of its loss.”). Moreover, if premiums are accurately priced, then risk-reduction
efforts can be accurately priced as well, giving insureds the ability to evaluate the
benefits and costs of specific risk-reduction efforts. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra
note 17, at 207 (noting that if insurers price the expected risk reduction associated with
the safety investment, insureds can make the choice of whether that safety investment
makes sense for them).
313 Laury & McInnes, supra note 312, at 224-26, 230-31.
314 Id. at 220-26, 230-31 (noting that accurate insurance prices lessen reliance
on biases).
315 See supra Section III.B.
316 See Boardman, supra note 312, at 839-40.
311
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manage at least some of the risks associated with foodborne
illness. Such products, for which coverage is triggered by a readily
detectable occurrence or condition, appear to be more effective
vehicles for managing some of the risks associated with food.
One such insurance product is food recall insurance, which
provides coverage for losses associated with the recall of a
contaminated or unsafe food.317 If a food supplier determines that
it has sent contaminated food to market, it has two choices: recall
the food or do nothing. Recalls can prevent further consumption
of contaminated food products,318 but they can also be very
expensive,319 creating an incentive to delay (or avoid entirely) a
recall. Given the risk of significant economic loss associated
with a product recall and the relatively low risk currently
presented by the tort system, food suppliers rationally avoid or at
least delay a product recall when they become aware of a
potential food safety problem.320 Insurance companies have
responded by offering recall insurance products.
While recall insurance cannot eliminate all the financial
risks associated with a recall, recall coverage can minimize
some of those risks,321 thereby promoting more timely recalls
when a supplier’s products pose risks to public health and
helping to remove dangerous products from the market. As
such, recall insurance could improve food safety.322 But unlike
liability insurance, which depends on a highly improbable
event—tort damages or settlement payments resulting from a
legal claim of injury from a foodborne illness—recall insurance
317 Skees et al., supra note 31, at 100. Recall insurance is by no means the
only type of insurance product that has the potential to lower the risk of foodborne
illness. For example, Tom Baker has proposed a framework for a risk-shifting product,
a bonded import safety warranty, that could supplement government safety regulation.
See Tom Baker, Bonded Import Safety Warranties, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 215 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009).
318 Skees et al., supra note 31, at 99-100.
319 A recall will generate direct costs, including costs associated with notice to
the public and the logistics of recovering and disposing of the contaminated food, and
indirect costs, such as reputational damage, loss of consumer confidence, lost profits,
loss of future revenue, and, for publicly traded companies, a decrease in share value.
See, e.g., Michael R. Thomsen & Andrew M. McKenzie, Market Incentives for Safe
Foods: An Examination of Shareholder Losses from Meat and Poultry Recalls, 83 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 526, 536 (2001) (finding that beef and chicken recalls involving serious
threats to consumer health reduce shareholder wealth in a company by a magnitude of
1.5%–3%); see also Jeffrey A. Lamken, Note, Efficient Accident Prevention as a
Continuing Obligation: The Duty to Recall Defective Products, 42 STAN. L. REV. 103,
109 (1989) (noting that damage to a firm’s brand and goodwill is often the costliest loss
associated with a product recall).
320 See Skees et al., supra note 31, at 108.
321 Amy O’Connor, Insurers: Product Recalls a ‘Death Sentence’ to Food
Manufacturers, Coverage Demand Still Lags, INS. J. (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.insurance
journal.com/magazines/features/2013/10/07/306786.htm [http://perma.cc/H52S-KRZA].
322 See Skees et al., supra note 31, at 108-09.
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depends on a readily identifiable event (a recall) that has
known and measurable direct and indirect costs. Insurers can
manage these costs to reduce claims. That is not to say that
recall insurance overcomes all market problems, but its one
focus—managing the risks associated with a recall—gives it
the ability to control one aspect of food risk in a socially
beneficial way. Yet even the FDA’s new mandatory recall
authority323 has not spurred significant demand for recall
insurance. Despite its benefits, recall insurance is still seen as
“luxury” coverage, in part because liability insurance appears
to be available to cover foodborne illness claims.324
No doubt, there are other potential risks associated with
a proliferation of food safety liability insurance.325 But the risks
of increased moral hazard, dispersion of faulty risk signals, and
a dampened demand for insurance products that could lower
the hazards posed by contaminated food should give pause to
advocates of an increased reliance on food safety liability
insurance, particularly given the weak benefits food safety
liability insurance appears to offer.
CONCLUSION
In the presence of ineffective government regulation of
food safety, some believe that food safety liability insurance
could lower the risk of foodborne illness. As a safety regulator,
liability insurance has strengths and weaknesses that are
highly context dependent. This article has described the
significant obstacles to using food safety liability insurance as a
regulator of food safety. The complex relationship between the
information problems related to food safety, the confounding
nature of foodborne illness, diminished tort liability, and the
presence of cognitive biases strongly suggest that food safety
liability insurance has a limited capacity to improve food safety.
What’s more, the likelihood that premiums will not accurately
reflect the risk of foodborne illnesses means that food safety
liability insurance could increase moral hazard, send inaccurate
signals to food suppliers regarding the risk of foodborne illnesses,
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
O’Connor, supra note 321 (quoting Louis Lubrano, senior vice president of
Global Crisis Management for Liberty International Underwriters).
325 For example, the availability of food safety liability insurance could replace
demand for reform of weak governmental food safety regulation. Indeed, food safety
liability insurance is already used by some as a gap-filler for exceptions to government
regulation of food safety. See Boys et al., The Food Safety Modernization Act, supra
note 20 (noting that demand for food safety liability insurance has arisen in response to
an exemption to the FSMA).
323
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and diminish demand for more effective insurance products, all of
which could lead to more—not fewer—cases of foodborne illness.
This analysis has significant implications for food safety by
moving the discussion of insurance beyond the traditional moral
hazard objections voiced by early food safety researchers, who
underestimated the regulatory power of liability insurance, and
providing a more thorough analysis for modern food safety
advocates who may overestimate the regulatory power of liability
insurance to control food risk.

